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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over Big Sky's appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). On April 6, 2005, the Utah Supreme Court transferred this appeal to
the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) and Rule 42 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (granting jurisdiction over "cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from
the Supreme Court").
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE NO. 1.
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Lawyers Title and
correctly denied Big Sky's Cross-motion for Summary Judgment because Big Sky's
Amended Complaint did not assert any statutory claims or common law claims for
vicarious liability against Lawyers Title.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court reviews the district court's determination
on summary judgment for correctness. See, e.g., Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003
UT8,1J20, 70P.3dl.
ISSUE NO. 2.
The trial court acted well within its discretion under Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, to deny the Motion to Amend, because Big Sky's motion was untimely
and would have prejudiced Lawyers Title, and also because Big Sky did not have an
adequate justification for delay in bringing its claims.
1

STANDARD OF REVIEW: An abuse of discretion standard applies to a trial
court's Rule 15(a) analysis. Gary Porter Construction v. Fox Construction, Inc., 2004
UT App 354,1[31, 101P.3d371.
ISSUE NO. 3.
The trial court also correctly determined on an independent basis under Rule 15(c),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that the proposed amendment would have been futile
because Big Sky was barred by the statutes of limitation from bringing claims against
Lawyers Title for vicarious and statutory liability.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A correctness standard applies to a trial court's Rule
15(c) analysis. Gary Porter Construction v. Fox Construction, Inc., 2004 UT App 354,
TJ31, 101 P.3d371.
ISSUE NO. 4.
Big Sky has waived its "identity of interest'' argument.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
'[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal [,] the issue must be
presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an
opportunity to rule on that issue." [citation omitted] This requirements puts
the trial judge on notice of the asserted error and allows for correction at
that time in the course of the proceeding, [citation omitted] For a trial court
to be afforded an opportunity to correct the error '(1) the issue must be
raised in a timely fashion[,] (2) the issue must be specifically raised[,] and
(3) the challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant
legal authority." [citation omitted]. Issues that are not raised at trial are
usually deemed waived, [citation omitted].
483 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, Tf51, 99 P.3d 801.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case/ Course of Proceedings,
Big Sky appeals from an Order entered by Judge W. Brent West of the Second
Judicial Court, which granted Lawyers Title's Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissed
Lawyers Title as a party from the litigation, and denied Big Sky's Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment, Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance, and Motion to Amend
Complaint. (R572-77). The trial court certified this Order as final. (R694-99).
On November 21, 1997, Big Sky filed a Complaint against Avis & Archibald Title
Insurance Agency ("Avis & Archibald") and Jayson Cherry for negligence and breach of
fiduciary duty stemming from Avis & Archibald's and Mr. Cherry's release of funds held
in escrow by Avis & Archibald to Wayne Ogden. (R001-006). Big Sky did not name
Lawyers Title as a defendant in the 1997 Complaint.
In Octobei 1999, Big Sky moved foi paitial summary judgment against Avis and
Archibald as to liability. (R046-103). The trial court granted Big Sky's Motion, and
determined that Avis & Archibald was liable to Big Sky for release of the escrow funds.
(Rl34-37) In November 1999, Avis & Archibald's counsel withdrew from the litigation.
(R138-40).
Two years later, on January 10, 2002, Big Sky moved the trial court for leave to
amend its Complaint to add Lawyers Title as a defendant. (R144-58). The trial court

3

granted Big Sky's motion (R167), and Big Sky served Lawyers Title on March 19, 2002.
(R173). Lawyers Title filed its answer on April 10, 2002. (R185-191).
During the next fifteen months, Big Sky conducted no discovery. Except for the
May 21, 2002 Answer that Fireman's Fund Insurance Company filed to the Amended
Complaint, no further proceedings took place in the case.
On July 23, 2003, Lawyers Title filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. (R204206). Big Sky opposed Lawyers Title's motion by filing its own Cross-motion for
Summary Judgment, claiming that Lawyers Title was liable under Utah Code Ann.
Section 31 A-23-308, renumbered 31 A-23a-407 (2003),1 the title insurer liability statute,
and under common law agency principles, for Avis & Archibald's release of the escrow
funds. (R334-61). In its memorandum, Big Sky asked for leave to amend to assert these
claims. (R340-41). Big Sky also requested additional time under Rule 56(f), "if
necessary/* to obtain discovery to oppose Lawyers Title's motion. (R334-35; 341-42).
After Lawyers Title filed its Reply Memorandum supporting its Summary
Judgment Motion, Big Sky filed a motion seeking leave to amend its pleadings to assert
its new claims. (R310).
After oral argument, (R720), the trial court granted Lawyers Title's Motion for
Summary Judgment, and denied Big Sky's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Rule

1

This Brief shall refer to this section of the Utah Code as Section 31 A-23-308.
The statute is reproduced in Appendix E.
4

56(f) Motion for Continuance, and Motion to Amend Complaint. (R572-77). The trial
court has certified this Order as final (R694-99). Big Sky appeals the trial court's Order
(R674-78).
Statement of Facts.
1.

In April of 1997, Avis & Archibald Title Insurance Agency ("Avis &

Archibald"), in an "off again on again" real estate transaction, released funds that it held
in behalf of Big Sky to a third party, violating Big Sky's escrow instructions to Avis &
Archibald. (R52-53;R135)
BIG SKY'S ORIGINAL 1997 COMPLAINT
2.

On November 21, 1997, Big Sky brought suit against Avis & Archibald and

its employee Jayson Cherry, alleging causes of action against them for negligence,
stemming from Avis & Archibald's release of the escrow funds. (R001-006)
3.

Big Sky did not name Lawyeis Title as a defendant in the Complaint.

4.

On October 22, 1999, Big Sky moved for summary judgment against Avis

& Archibald. (R049-57).
5.

On January 10, 2000, the trial court executed the Order granting Big Sky's

summary judgment. (Rl 34-36)
6.

In or about November 2000, Avis & Archibald ceased doing business and

its counsel, Robin Nalder, withdrew. (R138-39; R365)

5

BIG SKY'S REQUEST FOR INFORMA TION REGARDING A VIS AND ARCHIBALD'S
ERRORS AND OMISSIONS POLICY
7.

On April 4, 2001, Big Sky contacted Lawyers Title to request information

regarding Avis and Archibald's errors and omissions policy ("E&O Policy") issued by
Fireman's Fund Insurance. (R208)
8.

Lawyers Title provided the information to Big Sky on April 5, 2001. (R208-

9.

On April 13, 2001, Big Sky informed Lawyers Title that Big Sky was

09)

looking to Fireman's Fund and Avis and Archibald's E&O Policy to satisfy its claim
regarding the Big Sky v. Avis and Archibald matter (as referenced at the top of the letter).
(R224) Big Sky also requested additional information regarding the E&O Policy, which
Lawyers Title provided in May 2001 (R224; R208-09)
10.

After Big Sky's April 13th letter, it made no other requests to Lawyers Title

for information regarding Avis and Archibald's E&O Policy. (R209)
BIG SKY'S 2002 AMENDED COMPLAINT
11.

Two years after the trial court had entered judgment for liability against

Avis & Archibald, Big Sky obtained leave from the trial court in January 2002 to amend
its Complaint to add Lawyers Title for "fraud." (R144-46)
12.

Big Sky's only cause of action against Lawyers Title in the Amended

Complaint is the Sixth Cause of Action, which states as follows:

6

15. [Big Sky] has attempted to file a claim under Avis &
Archibald's professional liability policy but has been unable to get the
policy or policy number from the Defendant insurance companies.
44. Lawyers Title .. . knew that Defendant Firemen's Fund's agent,
Defendant TitlePac, had issued a professional liability insurance policy to
Defendant Avis & Archibald that was in full force and effect at the time of
[Big Sky's] claim.
45. Lawyers Title . . . ha[s] fraudulently attempted to conceal from
[Big Sky] that a professional liability insurance policy exists for Defendant
Avis & Archibald to cover [Big Sky's] claim, which fraud has damaged
[Big Sky] in an amount to be established upon proof at the time of trial.
46. Plaintiff is a third party beneficiary under any and all policies of
insurance issued by Lawyers Title, Fireman's Fund and Title Pac, and that
[sic] these parties are contractually liable for their insurance liabilities.
(R176; R180-81) (Appendix B).
In the prayer for relief, Big Sky asked:
3. For a finding that Defendants Lawyers'Title, Fireman's Fund
and Title Pac is [sic] liable for damages incurred by their insured and that
they committed a fraud upon Plaintiff in relation to the denial of Plaintiffs
claim for damages in relation to the escrowed funds and the unwillingness
to produce a policy or policy number for such insurance.
(Rl 82) (emphasis added).
13.

Lawyers Title was served with the Amended Complaint on March 19, 2002

and filed its answer on April 10, 2002. (R173-91).
14.

Fireman's Fund Insurance Company filed its answer to the Amended

Complaint on May 21, 2002.

7

15.

No further proceedings took place for the next fifteen months. Specifically,

Big Sky did not undertake any discovery. (Record Index).
LA WYERS' TITLE'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
16.

On July 23, 2003, Lawyers Title filed its summary judgment motion on the

only claim asserted against it, fraudulent nondisclosure. (R207-11)
17.

In its supporting memorandum, Lawyers Title noted that the first time Big

Sky had contacted Lawyers Title concerning Avis & Archibald's E&O Policy was on
April 4, 2001. (R208) Lawyers Title provided evidence that it had provided all of the
information that Big Sky requested concerning the E&O Policy, and that after it received
that information, Big Sky made no other requests for information. (R208-09)
18.

In opposition to Lawyers Title's Motion for Summary Judgment:
a.

Big Sky admitted that Lawyers Title had not attempted to

fiaudulently conceal the existence of the E&O Policy, but had piovided Big Sky
with all of the information Big Sky had requested regarding Avis & Archibald's
E&O Policy. (R335) Big Sky also admitted that the first time it contacted
Lawyers Title regarding the E&O Policy was on April 4, 2001. (R335);
b.

Big Sky raised new claims and issues to oppose Lawyers Title's

Motion and moved for summary judgment on these novel claims. (R720; R572)
Specifically, Big Sky sought summary judgment against Lawyers Title under Utah

8

Code Ann § 31A-23-308, the title insurer liability statute, and under common law
agency principles. (R336-40);
c.

Near the end of its opposing memorandum, Big Sky asked the trial

court for leave to amend. (R340-41) Big Sky's request for leave to amend
contained no motion, no mention of Rule 15, and no proposed Amended
Complaint. (R340-41)
19.

Lawyers Title then filed a consolidated memorandum, which included its

final reply supporting its own summary judgment motion, and also opposition to Big
Sky's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (hereafter "Reply Memorandum"). Lawyers
Title provided factual support for and argued that:
a.

The facts entitling Lawyers Title to summary judgment were

uncontested. (R267);
b.

Big Sky had not asserted in its Amended Complaint claims against

Lawyers Title under Section 31A-23-308 or under common law agency principles,
and that Big Sky was attempting to raise novel claims or theories for recovery in
its opposition to Lawyers Title's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R271-73);
c.

Utah law expressly precluded a party from amending the complaint

by raising novel claims or theories for recovery in a memorandum in opposition to
a motion for summary judgment. (R271-72 {citing Holmes Dev. LLC v. Cook,
2002 UT 38, If 31, 48 P.3d 895)).

9

d.

Big Sky's potential claims were time-barred. (R273-74);

e.

Lawyers Title had no liability under common law agency principles

for Avis & Archibald's release of the funds in escrow, as the agency agreement
between Lawyers Title and Avis & Archibald expressly provided that Avis &
Archibald was not Lawyers Title's agent for escrow purposes. (R274-77; R28385; R287; R291 U 6); and finally,
f.

Big Sky's cursory request for leave to amend at the end of its

opposing memorandum did not rise to the level of a motion for leave to amend and
should be denied. (R273 (quotingHolmes, 2002 UT 38, at 1f 59))
BIG SKY'S MOTION TO AMEND ITS AMENDED COMPLAINT.
20.

After Lawyers Title had pointed out in its final brief regarding the summary

judgment motion that Big Sky's request for leave to amend was ineffectual under the
rules, Big Sky then filed a Motion to Amend its Amended Complaint. (R310-11). In its
supporting Memorandum, Big Sky did not address Lawyers Title's argument that the new
proposed causes of action were time-barred. Big Sky also did not argue that the new
claims should or would relate back. (R313-15)
21.

Opposing Big Sky's Motion to Amend, Lawyers Title provided factual

support for and argued, inter alia, that:
a.

Big Sky had had all the information necessary to bring its purported

claim under Section 31A-23-308 in 1997 (R390-91); Big Sky's purported injury

10

had occurred more than six years prior (R387); more than one year had passed
since Lawyers Title was brought into the litigation and Big Sky had conducted no
discovery (R386); and Big Sky was "aware of the new issues raised in [its
Second] [A]mended Complaint long before [Big Sky]'s Motion was filed'" (R390
{quoting Bronson v. Jones, 2000 UT App 284, 2000 WL 33244137 (Memorandum
Decision))
b.

Big Sky's delay in bringing its untimely Motion was unjustifiable.

(R390-91)
c.

Allowing Big Sky leave to amend would unduly prejudice Lawyers

Title (R392): Specifically, Big Sky's unjustifiable delay in bringing these new
claims had left Lawyers Title without redress, because Avis & Archibald was no
longer in business (R392); and, Lawyers Title would be unduly prejudiced by
having to prepare a defense to claims stemming from a purported act that had
taken place more than six years earlier. (R393)
d.

Big Sky's proposed Section 31A-23-308 claim and common law

agency claim against Lawyers Title were legally insufficient and futile. (R393-96
{citing Analdex Res., Inc. v. Meyers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1994))).
(R393-96).
22.

In its Reply Memorandum supporting its Motion to Amend (R422-34), Big

Sky asserted in a single sentence, with no citation to Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil

11

Procedure or any legal authority, that "any amended cause of action relates back to the
original filing." (R432)
TRIAL COURT'S ORDER.
23.

On July 12, 2004, the trial court issued its Order (Appendix A), in which it:
a.

Granted Lawyers Title's Motion for Summary Judgment,

finding, inter alia, that the undisputed facts showed that Lawyers Title "made no
attempt to secret away or fraudulently conceal information concerning the
existence of Avis & Archibald's E&O Policy." (R573)
b.

Denied Big Sky's Rule 56(f) request on the basis that the

supporting affidavit was insufficient. (R574).
c.

Denied Big Sky's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment

finding that Big Sky, in its Amended Complaint, failed to plead causes of action
against Lawyers Title under Section 31A-23-308, or under "an agency theory/'
(R574-75)
d.

Denied Big Sky's Motion to Amend. The trial court's ruling

in this regard was as follows:
Having reviewed the requisite three factors for determining the
merits of Big Sky's Motion to Amend, specifically, Big Sky's
timeliness in bringing its Motion; Big Sky's justification for delay;
and any resulting prejudice to LTIC if the Court should grant Big
Sky's Motion, the Court issues the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law:

12

A.

Timeliness: The Court concludes that Big Sky's Motion to Amend is
untimely. Big Sky had a potential statutory cause of action against
LTIC under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-308, renumbered as Utah
Code Ann. § 31A-23-407, from the onset of the present litigation.
However, Big Sky elected not to assert that statutory claim until
LTIC moved for summary judgment to dismiss the sole claim
asserted against it, nearly seven years after filing its initial
Complaint. Big Sky's request for leave to amend is untimely.

B.

Justification for Delay: The Court acknowledges that Big Sky was
involved in an adversary bankruptcy proceeding related to the
present matter; however, Big Sky's involvement in that proceeding
does not provide adequate justification for Big Sky's delay in
seeking leave to amend its Amended Complaint. As stated above,
Big Sky had a potential statutory cause of action well before it filed
the present Motion to Amend.
The Court concludes that Big Sky has failed to show
justification for its untimely Motion.

C.

Prejudice: The Court concludes that were it to grant Big Sky's
Motion to Amend, doing so would unduly prejudice LTIC, because
Big Sky's potential Section [31 A-23-308] claim would be barred by
the applicable statute of limitations allowing Big Sky to bring a
legally futile claim; LTIC would have to prepare a defense to new
claims being asserted at this lime; although the events leading to
these new causes of action occurred nearly seven years ago; and
LTIC will likely have difficulty locating witnesses and documents.
For these reasons the Court concludes that LTIC would be unduly
prejudiced were this Court to grant Big Sky's Motion to Amend.

(R575-76) (Appendix A).
24.

On March 31, 2005, ten days after the trial court had certified its July 30,

2004 Order as final (R694-99), Big Sky filed its Notice of Appeal. (R674-78).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

BIG SKY'S AMENDED COMPLAINT DID NOT ASSERT ANY
STATUTORY CLAIMS OR ANY COMMON LAW CLAIMS FOR
VICARIOUS LIABILITY AGAINST LAWYERS TITLE.
No claims against Lawyers Title for statutory or common law vicarious liability

claims can be reasonably inferred from the language of the Amended Complaint. Big
Sky's objection on appeal is that the trial court did not stretch the language of the
pleading to find such allegations against Lawyers Title. In making this argument to this
Court, Big Sky has not set forth the pleading requirements for either cause of action. And
other than urging that such causes of action can be reasonably inferred from the language,
Big Sky has never stated, here or below, how its Amended Complaint adequately met
those requirements. As such this Court should decline to address the issue altogether.
If this Court does reach the issue, Big Sky has not met the pleading requirements
of Rule 8(a),U.R.Civ.P. The Amended Complaint docs not mention any statutory liability
and does not contain a single factual assertion that would support liability under Section
31A-23-308. There is no allegation that Avis & Archibald was Lawyers Title's agent the only relationship between Lawyers Title and Avis & Archibald that is alleged is one
of insurer and insured, i.e., that Lawyers Title should pay the damages that Big Sky
incurred pursuant to any insurance policy that it may have issued to Avis & Archibald.
Lawyers Title never had fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim under
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Section 31 A-23-308 or under any agency theory. The trial court correctly found that the
Amended Complaint did not include these causes of action.
II.

THESE CAUSES OF ACTION EXISTED IN 1997, WHEN BIG SKY
COMMENCED THIS LITIGATION.
"A cause of action accrues when 'it becomes remediable in the courts, that is when

the claim is in such condition that the courts can proceed and give judgment if the claim
is established."5 Dept ofNatural Resources v. Huntington-ClevelandIrr. Co., 52 P.3d
1257, 1264 (Utah 2002) (citation omitted). Big Sky's statutory and vicarious liability
causes of action existed in 1997, when this action was commenced.
Big Sky's argument that it did not have claims against Lawyers Title until its
damages were certain relies on events that occurred after the original complaint was filed.
Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that Big Sky's allegations of vicarious
and statutory liability against Lawyers Title existed at the inception of this litigation in
1997.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT HAD SEVERAL INDEPENDENT BASES ON
WHICH EXERCISED ITS BROAD DISCRETION TO DENY BIG SKY'S
UNTIMELY MOTION TO AMEND.
The decision whether to grant or deny leave to amend a pleading pursuant to Rule

15(a) is within the broad discretion of the trial court. Trial courts consider the three wellestablished factors in making such a determination: Timeliness, justification, and
prejudice. A court's ruling can be predicated on only one or two of the factors.
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Here, the trial court denied Big Sky's motion to amend on each of these three
bases, and made specific findings regarding each of these factors. The trial court's
finding on any one of those factors is sufficient alone to justify its ruling. The trial court
acted well within its discretion in denying Big Sky's Motion.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ALSO PROPERLY DENIED THE MOTION TO
AMEND BECAUSE BIG SKY'S CLAIMS FOR VICARIOUS AND
STATUTORY LIABILITY ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.
The trial court also addressed another independent factor in denying Big Sky's

Motion to Amend, i.e., that Big Sky's attempts to assert its new allegations against
Lawyers Title were futile. Because Big Sky's potential causes of action against Lawyers
Title existed in 1997, the claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.
V.

BIG SKY CANNOT SAVE ITS CLAIMS BY ARGUING THAT THEY
SHOULD HAVE RELATED BACK.
A.

BIG SKY DID NOT PRESERVE THIS ARGUMENT BELOW.

Big Sky's "argument" to the trial court on this issue was raised in its Reply
Memorandum supporting its Motion to Amend, and was comprised of a single sentence,
with no citation to Rule 15(c), U.R.Civ.P. or any other legal authority, and no analysis of
any sort at all. Accordingly, this Court should deem Big Sky's argument waived.
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B.

BIG SKY'S "IDENTITY OF INTEREST" ARGUMENT HAS BEEN
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.

Failing to brief the issue below, Big Sky asserts for the first time on appeal that
Avis & Archibald and Lawyers Title allegedly share an "identity of interest." This Court
should decline to consider this argument. Big Sky has not argued "plain error or
exceptional circumstances" in its opening Brief, as required by the Court to consider this
new argument.
C.

BIG SKY CANNOT DEMONSTRATE ANY "IDENTITY OF
INTEREST" BETWEEN AVIS & ARCHIBALD AND LAWYERS
TITLE SUFFICIENT FOR THE CLAIMS TO HAVE RELATED
BACK.

Even if this Court were to reach the issue, Big Sky's relation-back argument fails.
For an identity of interest to exist under Utah law, the two parties must share the "same
legal interest," meaning the legal position and defenses of the two parties must be the
same.
Big Sky argues only that there is an identity of interest because Lawyers Title
knew about the complaint against Avis & Archibald before it was made a party to the
litigation and that Lawyers Title would not be "prejudiced" by the relation back.
Assuming arguendo that Lawyers Title did know about the complaint, this is not enough
to meet the requirements to show an identity of interest. Lawyers Title does not share the
same legal interests as Avis & Archibald in the outcome of the litigation, and a
disposition as to one would not necessarily affect the claims or defenses available to the
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other. Lawyers Title had defenses not available to Avis & Archibald, and vice versa.
Thus, no identity of interest exists between Avis & Archibald and Lawyers Title.
ARGUMENT
I.

BIG SKY'S AMENDED COMPLAINT DID NOT ASSERT ANY
STATUTORY CLAIMS OR ANY COMMON LAW CLAIMS FOR
VICARIOUS LIABILITY AGAINST LAWYERS TITLE.
Big Sky argues that its Amended Complaint includes statutory or other common

law vicarious liability claims against Lawyers Title (Appellant's Brief, p. 33-37). But no
such claims can be reasonably inferred from the language of the Amended Complaint.
Big Sky's only cause of action against Lawyers Title in the Amended Complaint is the
Sixth Cause of Action, which states as follows:
15. [Big Sky] has attempted to file a claim under Avis &
Archibald's professional liability policy but has been unable to get the
policy or policy number from the Defendant insurance companies.
44. Lawyers Title . . . knew that Defendant Firemen's Fund's agent,
Defendant TitlePac, had issued a professional liability insurance policy to
Defendant Avis & Archibald that was in full force and effect at the time of
[Big Sky's] claim.
45. Lawyers Title . . . ha[s] fraudulently attempted to conceal from
[Big Sky] that a professional liability insurance policy exists for Defendant
Avis & Archibald to cover [Big Sky's] claim, which fraud has damaged
[Big Sky] in an amount to be established upon proof at the time of trial.
46. Plaintiff is a third party beneficiary under any and all policies of
insurance issued by Lawyers Title, Fireman's Fund and Title Pac, and that
[sic] these parties are contractually liable for their insurance liabilities.
(Rl 76; Rl 80-81) (Appendix B).
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In the prayer for relief, Big Sky asked:
3. For a finding that Defendants Lawyers Title, Fireman's Fund and
Title Pac is [sic] liable for damages incurred by their insured and that they
committed a fraud upon Plaintiff in relation to the denial of Plaintiff s claim
for damages in relation to the escrowed funds and the unwillingness to
produce a policy or policy number for such insurance.
(R182) (emphasis added) (Appendix B).
This language does state a claim against Lawyers Title for fraudulent concealment,
which the trial court dismissed because the undisputed facts showed that Lawyers Title
made no attempt to conceal information from Big Sky. (R573). Big Sky makes no
argument on appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing this claim. The language also
states a claim that Lawyers Title is liable for damages caused by "their insured" pursuant
to any insurance policy it may have issued to Avis & Archibald. Big Sky never proffered
any evidence that Lawyers Title had, in fact, issued an insurance policy to Avis &
Archibald. Instead, Big Sky asked for a Rule 56(f) continuance (R341-42), which the
trial court denied because the supporting Rule 56(e) affidavit lacked foundation and
specificity. (R574). Big Sky does not challenge this decision on appeal, either.2
Big Sky's objection on appeal is that the trial court did not stretch the language of
the pleading to find an allegation that Lawyers Title had statutory liability under Section
31A-23-308 or common law vicarious liability for Avis & Archibald's negligence. In

2

The evidence below was that Lawyers Title is a title insurer only, and that it
does not issue professional liability policies to anyone in the State of Utah, including Avis
& Archibald. (R268-69; 284).
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making this argument to this Court, Big Sky has not set forth the pleading requirements
for either cause of action. And other than urging that such causes of action can be
reasonably inferred from the language, Big Sky has never stated, here or below, how its
Amended Complaint adequately met those requirements. As such this Court should
decline to address the issue altogether. See, Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 2003 UT App. 85, ^
13-16, 69 P.2d 286, 290 (Utah App. 2003) (declining to address whether trial court erred
in dismissing claims when pleader failed to set forth pleading requirements and failed to
state how their second amended complaint adequately met those requirements).
If this Court does reach the issue, Rule 8(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
governs Utah's pleading requirements. The rule requires, inter alia, that a complaint
contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a). Longstanding Utah case law has interpreted Rule 8 to
require that the complainant "give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or
grounds of the claim." Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 Utah 2d 157, 160, 280 P.2d 453, 455
(1955). Because the trial court granted Lawyers Title's Motion for Summary Judgment
and denied Big Sky's Cross-motion for Summary Judgment, this Court reviews the
district court's determination for correctness. See Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co.,
2003UT8,1f20,70P.3dl.
Ellis v. Hale, 373 P.2d 382, 386 (Utah 1962), is illustrative of the fair notice
concept. There, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a complaint that had

20

asserted that a title insurance contract had been breached, stating that "the particular
provision or provisions claimed to have been breached are not set out in the complaint.
This claim does not meet the requirements of our rules and was properly dismissed." Id.
Here, the Amended Complaint is devoid of any mention of or reference to any
statutory liability on Lawyers Title's part, much less any specific mention to Section 31A23-308. Nor is there a single factual assertion that would support any liability under
Section 31A-23-308. There is no allegation that Avis & Archibald was Lawyers Title's
agent - the only relationship between Lawyers Title and Avis & Archibald that is alleged
in the Amended Complaint is in paragraph 46 and the prayer for relief- there, Big Sky
averred that the relationship was one of insurer and insured, i.e., that Lawyers Title
should pay the damages that Big Sky incurred pursuant to any insurance policy that it may
have issued to Avis & Archibald. (R176, par. 46; 181-82, par. 3). And the only mention
of insurance in the Amended Complaint in reference to Lawyers Title was that Avis &
Archibald allegedly was the "insured" under a liability policy that Lawyers Title had
presumably issued. (Rl 81-82).
Big Sky wanted the trial court to do more than "fill in the blanks," as was allowed
in Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963). Big Sky wanted the
trial court to charge Lawyers Title, because it is an insurance company, with any cause of
action that Big Sky might possibly have that could be related to any kind of insurance in
which Lawyers Title might be involved. While pleadings should be liberally construed, a
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litigant cannot be charged with notice of any claim that might be brought against it based
upon the nature of its business. Lawyers Title never had "fair notice of the nature and
basis or grounds" for a claim under Section 31A-23-308 or under any agency theory.
Blackham, 280 P.2d at 455. The trial court correctly found that the Amended Complaint
did not include these causes of action.
II.

THESE CAUSES OF ACTION EXISTED IN 1997, WHEN BIG SKY
COMMENCED THIS LITIGATION.
"A cause of action accrues when 'it becomes remediable in the courts, that is when

the claim is in such condition that the courts can proceed and give judgment if the claim
is established.'" Dept of Natural Resources v. Huntington-Cleveland Irr. Co., 2002 UT at
1J24, 52 P.3d at 1264 (citation omitted), cited by Big Sky at p. 19 of its Brief. Big Sky's
statutory and vicarious liability causes of action existed in 1997, when this action was
commenced.
STATUTORY CLAIM. Under Section 31 A-23-308, a title insurer is "directly and
primarily liable" for the disbursement of funds held in escrow by its agent who has issued
the title insurer's commitment or a policy of insurance in connection with the transaction.
Big Sky's own pleadings demonstrate that every element necessary for proof of Lawyers
Title's alleged liability under this statute existed in 1997. In its original Complaint, Big
Sky alleged that Avis & Archibald had negligently disbursed funds held in escrow.
(R001-006) Big Sky alleged that it had been damaged by Avis & Archibald's negligent
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disbursement of $396,000.00 of escrow funds. (R001-006) Big Sky asked for punitive
damages in the amount of $500,000.00, and alleged that it had incurred damages in the
form of attorney fees due to Avis & Archibald's negligent disbursement of the funds.
(R001-006). The commitment for title insurance which Big Sky alleges was issued in
connection with the transaction has an effective date of November 1996. (R345). Big
Sky repeatedly argued to the trial court that pursuant to the statute, Lawyers Title was
"strictly liable" for Avis & Archibald's mishandling of the escrow funds. (R425; R720
pp.5-6). In its memoranda submitted in support of its summary judgment motion on this
(unpleaded) claim, Big Sky set out these very elements, never once mentioning the date in
2002 that it claims its damages were fixed. (R3 34-342). Thus, Big Sky itself recognizes
that the 2002 date is simply not an element of liability under the statute.
In sum, "all of the elements of [Section 31A-23-308] creating liability existfed] or
may [have] be[en] established" in November 1997. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co.,
2002 UT 75 at U 24.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY. Any vicarious liability claim that Big Sky may have
had against Lawyers Title also existed in November 1997. Lawyers Title would be
vicariously liable for Avis & Archibald's wrongful disbursement of escrowed funds only
there was an actual or apparent agency relationship between them with respect to Avis &
Archibald's escrow activities. Bodell Const. Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 945 P.2d
119, 124-25 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). That relationship would have had to have existed at
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the time that Avis & Archibald negligently disbursed the $396,000.00 held by it in
escrow. See Glover v. Boy Scouts of America, 923 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1996) (no
vicarious liability can exist if the agent was not acting within the scope of his agency at
the time the tort occurred). Thus, all of the elements necessary to allege vicarious
liability existed at the time Avis & Archibald negligently disbursed the funds, and Big
Sky could have brought a claim against Lawyers Title for vicarious liability at the same
time it sued Avis & Archibald in 1997.
Big Sky's argument that it did not have claims against Lawyers Title until its
damages were certain relies on events that occurred after the original complaint was filed.
As Big Sky notes, Wayne Ogden paid part of the funds back after Big Sky filed its
original complaint, and then Big Sky was required to repay those funds to Ogden's
bankruptcy trustee. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6). As a result of these events, Big Sky was not
made whole. But at the time the original complaint was filed, its damage was in "such
condition that the court[ could] proceed and give judgment if the claim is established.'"
Huntington-ClevelandIrr. Co., 2002 UT 75 at TJ24; 52 P.3d at 1264. Even Big Sky's
counsel recognized at the motion hearing, "The facts are consistent. The facts have
always been the same right from the start. Jayson Cherry and Avis & Archibald
mishandled escrow funds." (R720, p.6) Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined
that Big Sky's allegations of vicarious and statutory liability against Lawyers Title
existed at the inception of this litigation in 1997.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT HAD SEVERAL INDEPENDENT BASES ON
WHICH EXERCISED ITS BROAD DISCRETION TO DENY BIG SKY'S
UNTIMELY MOTION TO AMEND.
Its Amended Complaint failing to include claims against Lawyers Title for

vicarious or statutory liability, Big Sky argues that the trial court erroneously denied leave
to amend to include those claims. A litigant may ask for leave to amend his pleading
pursuant to Rule 15(a). See Utah R.Civ.P. 15 "The granting or denial of leave to amend
a pleading is within the broad discretion of the trial court, and [appellate courts] will not
disturb absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.'" Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc.,
2004 UT App 44,T{ 41, 87 P.3d 734 (quoting Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions, 2003
UT 57,H 31, 84 P.3d 1154). This Court has explained that "[t]rial courts are in a much
better position than appellate courts to make such case-specific determinations as whether
too much time has passed to fairly allow an amendment, whether a party's delay is the
result of an unfair tactic or dilatory motive, or whether some other unforeseen factor
militates for or against a particular result in that particular case." Id.
In analyzing a motion to amend, this Court has stated that a trial court is "welladvised" to consider the following three well-established factors in determining whether
to grant or deny a motion to amend: Timeliness, justification, and prejudice. Id. at ^f 39.
Further, the "circumstances of a particular case may be such that a court's ruling on a
motion to amend can be predicated on only one or two of the particular factors." Id. at f
42 (citing First City Bank, N.A. v. Air Capitol Aircraft Sales, Inc., 820 F.2d 1127, 1133
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(10th Cir. 1987) ("We hold that a district court acts within its discretion when it denies
leave to amend for 'untimeliness' or 'undue delay.' Prejudice to the opposing party need
not be shown also")). Here, the trial court denied Big Sky's motion to amend on each of
these three bases. (R575).3
In its ruling on the timeliness factor, the trial court stated:
Timeliness: The Court concludes that Big Sky's Motion to Amend is
untimely. Big Sky had a potential statutory cause of action against LTIC
under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-308, renumbered as Utah Code Ann. §
3 lA-23a-407, from the onset of the present litigation. However, Big Sky
elected not to assert that statutory claim until LTIC moved for summary
judgment to dismiss the sole claim asserted against it, nearly seven years
after filing its initial Complaint. Big Sky's request for leave to amend is
untimely.
(R 575)(Appendix A). Big Sky's motion to amend had come at the eleventh hour, some
seven years into the case, fifteen (15) months after Lawyers Title had been dragged in,
seven months after the default discovery termination date required by Rule 26(d) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and after completion of briefing on Lawyers Title's

3

Big Sky incorrectly asserts on pp. 24-25 of its Brief that the trial court relied on
Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, 48 P.3d 895 (Utah 2002) to deny the Motion for
Leave to Amend. Lawyers Title had cited to Holmes in support of its own summary
judgment motion, noting that a litigant cannot oppose summary judgment by raising
previously unpleaded claims or theories for recovery. (R271). Big Sky's unpleaded
theories that it sought to bring through its subsequent Motion to Amend did not state
claims that would affect the fraud claim that the trial court dismissed on summary
judgment. The trial court properly ignored those unpleaded theories pursuant to Holmes
in granting Lawyers Title's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing the fraud
claim. Big Sky has not argued on appeal that the trial court erroneously dismissed the
fraud claim. Holmes is of no consequence on appeal because the trial court did not rely
on it to deny the Motion to Amend.
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motion for summary judgment requesting the trial court to dismiss Big Sky's frivolous
claim.
When analyzing the timeliness factor, this Court has indicated that "regardless of
the procedural posture of the case, motions to amend have typically been deemed untimely
when they were filed several years into the litigation" Kelly, 2004 UT App at ^ 30
(emphasis added) {citing, among others, Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025,
1025 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (upholding denial of motion to amend where the motion was
filed three years after the commencement of the suit and eight years after the original
injury); Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto, Ins. Co., 829 P.2d 142, 149 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
(upholding denial of motion to amend where the motion was filed six years after filing of
the original suit)). "In such cases, the ongoing passage of time makes it increasingly
difficult for the nonmoving party to effectively respond to the new allegations or claims.
Parties in such circumstances are often hindered by witnesses who have since moved or
died, by their shaky memories and recollections, or by documents which have since been
lost or destroyed." Kelly, 2004 UT App at ^ 30.
The timeliness factor weighs into the prejudice factor, which the trial court here
also recognized:
Prejudice: The Court concludes that were it to grant Big Sky's
Motion to Amend, doing so would unduly prejudice LTIC, because Big
Sky's potential Section [31A-23-308] claim would be barred by the
applicable statute of limitations allowing Big Sky to bring a legally futile
claim; LTIC would have to prepare a defense to new claims being asserted
at this time; although the events leading to these new causes of action
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occurred nearly seven years ago; and LTIC will likely have difficulty
locating witnesses and documents.
(R 575) (Appendix A).4 In the case at bar, regardless of whether the statute of limitations
had run (see arguments, infra at Points IV and V), the difficulty in locating witnesses and
documents seven years after the transaction and long after Avis & Archibald had ceased
doing business - that difficulty alone justifies the trial court's refusal to grant Big Sky
leave to amend its complaint. Kelly, 2002 UT App. 44 at ^[42.
The trial court also found that Big Sky had failed to justify its delay in bringing the
claims.
Justification for Delay: The Court acknowledges that Big Sky was
involved in an adversary bankruptcy proceeding related to the present
matter; however, Big Sky's involvement in that proceeding does not
provide adequate justification for Big Sky's delay in seeking leave to amend
its Amended Complaint. As stated above, Big Sky had a potential statutory
cause of action well before it filed the present Motion to Amend.
The Court concludes that Big Sky has failed to show justification for
its untimely Motion.
(R575) (Appendix A).5 In addressing the justification prong, this Court has indicated that
the "analytic thrust" should be the reasons offered by the moving party for not including
the facts or allegations in the original complaint. Kelly, 2002 UT App. 44 at <f| 38.
"Forexample, in cases where the party knew of the events or claims earlier yet failed to
4

This finding directly contradicts Big Sky's claim on p. 27 of its Brief that the
trial court had made no finding that the ongoing passage of time would make it difficult
for Lawyers Title to effectively respond to any new claims brought against it.
5

This finding directly contradicts the argument at pps. 27-28 of Big Sky's Brief
that the trial court did not find that Big Sky's delay was unjustified.
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plead them due to a dilatory motive, bad faith effort during the pleading process, or
unreasonable neglect in terms of pleading preparation, it would follow that the motion to
amend could be denied on that basis." Id. In the instant case, where all of the elements
for bringing the alleged claims against Lawyers Title existed in 1997, the bankruptcy
proceeding did not prevent Big Sky from seeking to amend its complaint long before
2002. Big Sky told the trial court that had the bankruptcy proceedings gone differently,
and Big Sky been able to retain the funds, it still would have asserted damages against
Lawyers Title.
[T]he Plaintiff had hoped that the appeal [to the Tenth Circuit] would be
successful thereby significantly reducing any potential claim which Plaintiff
may have against Avis & Archibald or its insurance companies.
(R426). See, also R720, p.5 ("Could be that Big Sky would come back and say, all we
have here's defense costs perhaps"). Yet the only excuse Big Sky ever offered for the
lengthy delay was the bankruptcy proceeding. As the trial court noted, "I have the sense
that everybody thought this was gonna be handled, and then when Avis & Archibald went
out of business and filed bankruptcy, [Big Sky] had to scramble to find where the deep
pockets might be. .. ." (R720, pp. 23-24). The trial court acted well within its discretion
in finding that Big Sky had failed to proffer an adequate justification for its delay. This
finding is also sufficient on its own to uphold the trial court's denial of Big Sky's Motion
to Amend.
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IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ALSO PROPERLY DENIED THE MOTION TO
AMEND BECAUSE BIG SKY'S CLAIMS FOR VICARIOUS AND
STATUTORY LIABILITY ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.
Each of the trial court's findings on the three factors analyzed above is alone

sufficient without further analysis to uphold its denial of Big Sky's motion to amend.
Nevertheless, the trial court also addressed another factor, i.e., that Big Sky's attempts to
assert its new allegations against Lawyers Title were futile. Trial courts properly deny
motions to amend "when the moving party seeks to assert a legally insufficient or futile
claim." Andalex Res., Inc. v. Meyers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). When
a claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, then there is no point to
amending a complaint to include it. The effort is futile. See Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc.,
2003 UT 51, H139, 82 P.3d 1076 (court may deny motion to amend as futile if proposed
amendment would not withstand a motion to dismiss).
Analyzing this factor, the trial court correctly concluded that Big Sky had a
potential claims against Lawyers Title from the "get-go." (R720 p.23) The trial court also
correctly concluded that Big Sky's potential claim under Section 31A-23-308 was a
"statutory remedy," unlike "suing the owner of [a] car and deciding whether or not to
name the insurance company or not. "From the get-go, [Big Sky] had a statutory cause
of action . . . against the insurance companies and they could have been sued directly at
any time right out of the chute because that statute exists." (R720 p. 23 (emphasis
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added)) In sum, the trial court correctly concluded, as reflected in its Order (R572-76)
and the hearing transcript (R720), that Big Sky had these same potential causes of action
against Lawyers Title in 1997. See, also, Point II supra.
Big Sky's statutory claim is governed by the three-year statute of limitations found
in Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-26(4) ("[a]n action may be brought within three years: .
. . (4) for a liability by the statutes of this State"). (R393). Its common law claim is
governed by the four-year statute of limitations found in Utah Code Ann. Section 78-1225(3). Accordingly, both of the claims that Big Sky sought to assert against Lawyers
Title were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.
V.

BIG SKY CANNOT SAVE ITS CLAIMS BY ARGUING THAT THEY
SHOULD HAVE RELATED BACK.
A.

BIG SKY DID NOT PRESERVE THIS ARGUMENT BELOW.

Big Sky seeks to avoid the statute of limitations by claiming that Rule 15(c) would
allow its proposed claims against Lawyers Title to relate back to the filing of the 1997
Complaint against Avis & Archibald. Big Sky protests that its "relation back arguments
were ignored" by the trial court. (Appellant's Brief, p. 20). Big Sky's "arguments" to the
trial court on this issue were comprised of a single sentence in its Reply Memorandum
filed in support of its Motion to Amend. Big Sky simply asserted in conclusory fashion
that "any amended cause of action relates back to the original filing." (R432) (Appendix
D). Raised for the first time in Big Sky's reply pleadings, the issue was correctly ignored
by the trial court.
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It is the responsibility of the moving party to raise in its ... motion all of the
issues on which it believes it is entitled to [prevail]. Allowing the moving
party to raise new issues in its rebuttal materials is improper because the
nonmoving party has no opportunity to respond. It is for this reason that, in
the analogous area of appellate review, the rule is well settled that the court
will not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief
State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Utah App. 1993).
Moreover, Big Sky did not analyze the issue at all - it did not cite to Rule 15(c) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or to any other legal authority, but stated only that the
claims should relate back. (R432). At the motion hearing, Big Sky's counsel even
admitted that he had not taken time to brief the statute of limitations issue (R720, p. 16).
'[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal [,] the issue must be
presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an
opportunity to rule on that issue." [citation omitted] This requirements puts
the trial judge on notice of the asserted error and allows for correction at
that time in the course of the proceeding, [citation omitted] For a trial court
to be afforded an opportunity to correct the error'(1) the issue must be
raised in a timely fashion[,] (2) the issue must be specifically raised[,] and
(3) the challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant
legal authority." [citation omitted]. Issues that are not raised at trial are
usually deemed waived, [citation omitted].
483 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72,1f51, 99 P.3d 801. Merely mentioning
the issue in the pleadings is not enough. LeBaron & Assoc, Inc. v. Rebel Enterprises,
Inc., 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah App. 1991). Accordingly, this Court should deem Big
Sky's argument waived.
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B.

BIG SKY'S "IDENTITY OF INTEREST" ARGUMENT HAS BEEN
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.

Failing to brief the issue below, Big Sky asserts for the first time on appeal that
Avis & Archibald and Lawyers Title allegedly share an "identity of interest." This Court
should decline to consider this argument. See Tindley v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist, 2005
UT 30,^j 10, fn.2, 116 P.3d 295 (declining to address issues first raised on appeal by
appellant). Big Sky has not argued "plain error or exceptional circumstances" in its
opening Brief, as required by the Court to consider this new argument, further reaffirming
that this Court should decline to address Big Sky's argument. Rule 24(a)(5)(B), Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure; In re D.S., 2003 UT App 108,1f 1, 2003 WL 21290704
(Memorandum Decision).
C.

BIG SKY CANNOT DEMONSTRATE ANY "IDENTITY OF
INTEREST" BETWEEN AVIS & ARCHIBALD AND LAWYERS
TITLE SUFFICIENT FOR THE CLAIMS TO HAVE RELATED
BACK.

Even if this Court were to reach the issue, Big Sky's relation-back argument fails.
Big Sky cites to Gary Porter Constr. v. Fox Constr., 2004 UT App. 354, 101 P.3d 371,
and urges that Lawyers Title has an "identity of interest" with Avis & Archibald because
it knew about the litigation and was unofficially involved before it was made a party.
Appellant's Brief, pp. 20-23. Under Utah law, however, an identity of interest does not
exist "whenever an unnamed party happen[s] to know about the filing of a complaint."
Penrose v. Ross, 2003 UT App 157, f 20, 71 P.3d 631. For an identity of interest to exist,
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parties must also share the "same legal interest/' meaning the legal position and defenses
of the two parties must be the same. Id. at^|19.
In Gary Porter, a subcontractor had sued the general contractor, but waited until
after the statute of limitations had run to amend the complaint to name the general
contractor's surety. Gary Porter, 2004 UT App 354 at ^[6. The trial court granted
summary judgment to the surety on its statute of limitations defense, finding that the
amended complaint did not relate back to the original filing. See id. at f 8. This Court
reversed and remanded the case to the trial court to make a determination as to whether
the surety had had notice of the original complaint. See id. at ^45. There was no need in
Gary Porter to discuss or analyze whether the general contractor and the surety shared the
same legal interest, because under Utah law, a principal and surety share an identity of
interest in the indemnity context. Penrose, 2003 UT App 157 at ^[16, fn.4 {citing James
Constr., Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 888 P.2d 665, 669 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). Disposition of the claim against one would dispose of the claim against the other.
In contrast, in Penrose, the parties' interests were not the same. There, a son was
involved in an accident while driving his father's car. See Penrose, 2003 UT App. 157 at
fflf 2-4. Days before the statute of limitations had run, the plaintiff sued the father for
negligence, alleging that the father was driving the car. See id. at ^ 2. After the statute of
limitations had run, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint naming the son as the driver,
and alleging a claim for negligence against him. See id. at ^f 3. Both father and son
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moved for summary judgment. The son argued the statute of limitations had run on the
negligence claim asserted against him. See id. at ^[ 5. The trial court granted both
motions, and found that no "identity of interest" existed between the father and son to
relate the claim against the son back to the timely filed complaint against the father. See
id. at T[ 6. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that an identity of interest exists when "the real
party is alerted to the proceedings so as to avoid prejudice." See id. at ^j 10. The plaintiff
urged that it
was reasonable to assume that father told [son] he was served with a
complaint asserting damages resulting from the accident involving [son]
because (1) father was served at the same residence as [son], (2) father
knew [son] was driving his car and was in an accident, (3) father knew he
was not the driver involved in the accident, (4) [son] was insured by father's
insurance policy, and (5) father and [son] had the same attorney.
Id. at Tf 10. The plaintiff argued that because son had notice of the lawsuit, he would not
be prejudiced by being brought in as a defendant after the statute of limitations had run on
the negligence claim.
This Court affirmed the trial court's ruling finding no identity of interest, explaining that mere knowledge of a complaint being filed was not enough to establish an
identity of interest for relation back purposes. See id. atffl[1, 20. The new and old party
must have the same legal interest in the case. See id. at ^f 19.
[H]ad Penrose's Original Complaint properly named the parties, a
disposition of the case against Father would not affect a determination as to
Ross [son] because the two parties do not have the same legal interest in the
outcome of the case. Father's defense is that he was not negligent or liable
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because he was nt the driver. On the other hand, Ross's affirmative defense
focuses on the running of the statute of limitations. Even if the claim had
been properly filed, Ross's defense would be that he did not act negligently.
A disposition as to either party does not affect the claims or defenses
available to the other party. Thus, where they do not have the "same" legal
interest, there is no identity of interest.
Id. (emphasis in original).
The fact that the two defendants were father and son, both with knowledge of the
complaint, was simply not enough. Further, the Court rejected the plaintiffs argument
that a showing of no "prejudice" to the unnamed party based upon prior knowledge of the
complaint was enough to establish an identity of interest, because, as the Court explained,
the exception to Rule 15(c) would "swallow the rule and allow relation back whenever an
unnamed party happened to know about the filing of a complaint." Id. at Tf 20; cf., Russell
v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995) (focusing on the relationship between the
parties in upholding the trial court's finding that the amendment did not relate back).
Big Sky argues only that there is an identity of interest because Lawyers Title
knew about the complaint against Avis & Archibald before it was made a party to the
litigation and that Lawyers Title would not be "prejudiced" by the relation back.
(Appellant's Brief at 22-23). Assuming arguendo that Lawyers Title did know about the
complaint, this is not enough to meet the Penrose requirements. Similar to Penrose,
Lawyers Title does not share the same legal interests as Avis & Archibald in the outcome
of the litigation, and "a disposition as to either does not affect the claims or defenses
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available to the other party." Penrose, 2003 UT App. 157 at TJ 19. Lawyers Title was not
Avis & Archibald's errors and omissions insurance carrier, meaning it was not
indemnifying Avis & Archibald. Therefore a judgment against Avis & Archibald was not
necessarily a judgment against Lawyers Title. If the elements of Section 31 A-23-308 are
proven, a title underwriter's liability is "direct and primary." Based on this language, Big
Sky itself argued that Lawyers Title's potential liability under the statute is "strict" (R425;
R720 pp.5-6). Under Utah law, proof of liability under a strict liability statute does not
require a finding of negligence. See, e.g., Sharp v. Williams, 915 P.2d 495 (Utah 1996)
(holding that it is unnecessary for injured party to allege and prove negligence under
statute imposing strict liability on owner of dog). Any potential liability on the part of
Lawyers Title, statutory or common law, would be dependent upon facts that had no
relevance to Big Sky's negligence claim against Avis & Archibald. For example, Big Sky
would be required to prove that Lawyers Title had an agency relationship sufficient to
establish common law vicarious liability. Big Sky would have to prove that any
commitment or policy of title insurance that was issued had in fact been issued in
connection with the transaction whereby Big Sky was harmed. Lawyers Title's defenses
would also include an argument that Section 31A-23-308 is unconstitutional,6 and that
Avis & Archibald was not Lawyers Title's agent for escrow purposes. And like the son
6

Judge J. Dennis Frederick of the Third District Court of the State of Utah, Salt
Lake County, recently ruled that U.C.A. Section 31 A-23-308 violates Article I, Section
24 of the Utah Constitution. (See Appendix F hereto, p. 6)
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in Penrose, Lawyers Title also had a statute of limitations defense that was not available
to the original party to the complaint (father in Penrose, Avis & Archibald in the case at
bar). See Penrose, 2003 UT App. 157 at f 19.
Avis & Archibald had none of these defenses. Instead, its primary defense was
that it was not negligent in releasing the escrow funds. (R016-24) Thus, "disposition of
the case against [Lawyers Title] would not affect a determination as to [Avis &
Archibald] because the parties do not have the same legal interest in the outcome of the
case." Penrose, 2003 UT App 157 at ^[ 19. In sum, no identity of interest exists between
Avis & Archibald and Lawyers Title.
Thus, the trial court correctly determined that Big Sky's potential claims under
Section 31A-23-308 and under common law agency principles were time-barred and
patently untimely. Big Sky cursory's relation-back arguments fail.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Lawyers Title respectfully requests that the Court affirm
the decisions of the trial court that denied Big Sky's Motion to Amend and granted
Lawyers Title's Motion for Summary Judgment. Additionally, Lawyers Title respectfully
requests that this Court rule upon Lawyers Title's claim for attorneys fees and costs on
appeal, which issue the Court deferred in its Order on Lawyers Title's Motion for
Summary Disposition.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BIG SKY FINANCE COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.

AVIS AND ARCHIBALD TITLE
INSURANCE AGENCY, limited company,
LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE
CORPORATION, a Virginia corporation
doing business in the State of Utah,
FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE
COMPANY, a California corporation doing
business in the State of Utah, TITLE PAC,
INC., an Oklahoma company doing business
in the State of Utah, JAYSON CHERRY,
WILLIAM A. AVIS, and ROBIN
ARCHIBALD,

Order(LTIC's Motion for Summary Judgment is Grantee

970907313

VD11720401
LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORPOR

Civil No. 970907313
Judge W. Brent West

Defendants.
On April 21, 2004, at the hour of 2:00 p.m., this Court heard oral argument on the
following Motions: Defendant Lawyers Title Insurance Company's ("LTIC") Motion for
Summary Judgment; Plaintiff Big Sky Finance Company's ("Big Sky") Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment; Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance; and Motion to Amend Big Sky's
rr **? o

Amended Complaint. Plaintiff having appeared by and through its counsel Douglas M. Durbano,
of the Durbano Law Firm, Defendant LTIC having appeared by and through its counsel Richard
A. Rappaport and Edward T. Vasquez of COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C., and Paul M.
Belnap appeared for Defendant Fireman's Fund Insurance Company. The Court having reviewed
the pleadings, supporting materials, and having heard oral argument on the aforementioned
Motions, has determined that Big Sky's Amended Complaint asserts a single cause of action
against LTIC, that being a claim for fraudulent non-disclosure. Big Sky's Amended Complaint
does not mention or assert any claim against LTIC under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-308,
renumbered as Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23a-407 (2004), nor does Big Sky's Amended Complaint
mention or assert a claim against LTIC under any agency theory, specifically, that Avis and
Archibald was LTIC's agent for escrow purposes.
Big Sky's Amended Complaint alleges that LTIC fraudulently failed to disclose the
existence of Defendant Avis and Archibald's professional liability policy ("E&O Policy"). It is
not disputed that LTIC has provided Big Sky with all of the information that Big Sky requested
concerning Avis and Archibald's E&O Policy. The Court has also determined that LTIC had no
duty to disclose to Big Sky the existence of Avis and Archibald's E&O Policy. Therefore, based
upon the foregoing, the Court issues the following Conclusions of Law:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
LTIC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1.

The undisputed facts show that LTIC made no attempt to secret away or

fraudulently conceal information concerning the existence of Avis and Archibald's E&O Policy.
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2.

LTIC had no duty to disclose to Big Sky the existence of Avis and Archibald's

E&O Policy.
3.

Big Sky's fraudulent nondisclosure claim against LTIC fails as a matter of law,

and the Court therefore grants LTIC's Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing with prejudice
Big Sky's sole claim against LTIC.
BIG SKY'S RULE 56ffl MOTION
1.

The Court finds that Big Sky's Affidavit in support of its Rule 56(f) Motion is

insufficient to sustain Big Sky's Motion for the following reasons:
a.

Big Sky's Affidavit lacks foundation and specificity as to what

information it seeks with respect to its claims against LTIC in the Amended Complaint; and
b.

Big Sky has failed to identify with any specificity what "policies of

insurance" it alleges existed and whether LTIC was a party to these alleged policies.
2.

Having granted LTIC's Motion for Summary Judgment, concluding that LTIC had

no duty to disclose to Big Sky the existence of Avis and Archibald's E&O Policy, that LTIC
responded to all inquiries for information from Big Sky concerning that E&O Policy, and that
Big Sky's Rule 56(f) Affidavit is insufficient, the Court hereby denies Big Sky's Motion for Rule
56(f) Continuance. Additional discovery in this matter is not warranted and Big Sky's Motion is
denied.
BIG SKY'S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1.

The court finds that Big Sky moved for summary judgment on claims under Utah

Code Ann. § 31A-23-308, renumbered as Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23a-407, and under an agency
theory, that it failed to plead in its Amended Complaint.
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2.

Having found that Big Sky has failed to assert these claims against LTIC in its

Amended Complaint, the Court hereby denies Big Sky's cross motion for summary judgment.
BIG SKY'S MOTION TO AMEND ITS AMENDED COMPLAINT
1.

Having reviewed the requisite three factors for determining the merits of Big

Sky's Motion to Amend, specifically, Big Sky's timeliness in bringing its Motion; Big Sky's
justification for delay: and any resulting prejudice to LTIC if the Court should grant Big Sky's
Motion, the Court issues the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
a.

Timeliness: The Court concludes that Big Sky's Motion to Amend is

untimely. Big Sky had a potential statutory cause of action against LTIC under Utah Code Ann.
§ 31A-23-308, renumbered as Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23a-407, from the onset of the present
litigation. However, Big Sky elected not to assert that statutory claim until LTIC moved for
summary judgment to dismiss the sole claim asserted against it, nearly seven years after filing its
initial Complaint. Big Sky's request for leave to amend is untimely.
b.

Justification for Delay: The Court acknowledges that Big Sky was

involved in an adversary bankruptcy proceeding related to the present matter; however, Big Sky's
involvement in that proceeding does not provide adequate justification for Big Sky's delay in
seeking leave to amend its Amended Complaint. As stated above, Big Sky had a potential
statutory cause of action well before it filed the present Motion to Amend.
The Court concludes that Big Sky has failed to show justification for its untimely
Motion.
c.

Prejudice: The Court concludes that were it to grant Big Sky's Motion to

Amend, doing so would unduly prejudice LTIC, because Big Sky's potential Section 31 A-23a4

407 claim would be barred by the applicable statute of limitations allowing Big Sky to bring a
legally futile claim; LTIC would have to prepare a defense to new claims being asserted at this
time; although the events leading to these new causes of action occurred nearly seven years ago;
and LTIC will likely have difficulty locating witnesses and documents.
For these reasons the Court concludes that LTIC would be unduly prejudiced were
this Court to grant Big Sky's Motion to Amend.
2.

The Court having made the aforementioned Conclusions of Law, hereby denies

Big Sky's Motion to Amend.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

LTIC's Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted in its entirety;

2.

Big Sky's Rule 56(f) Motion for a Continuance is Denied;

3.

Big Sky's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment is Denied;

4.

Big Sky's Motion to Amend is Denied; and
*:**->^Sk^>.^»S

5.

LTIC is dismissed as a Defendant in this matter.

DATED this J L _ day of

P*^

2004.
BY THE COURT

k

The Honorable W. Brent West
Second Judicial District Court
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Douglas M. Durbano
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
':

~

APR
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BIG SKY FINANCE COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
: AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff,
vs.
AVIS AND ARCHIBALD TITLE INSURANCE
AGENCY, limited company, LAWYERS TITLE . Civil No. 970907313
INSURANCE CORPORATION, a Virginia
corporation doing business in the State of Utah,
FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY,
a California corporation doing business in the State
of Utah, TITLE PAC, INC., an Oklahoma company :
business in the STATE OF UTAH, JAYSON
CHERRY, WILLIAM A. AVIS, and ROBIN
ARCHIBALD,
Defendants.

. Judge W. Brent West

Plaintiff, through counsel undersigned for its cause of action against Defendants complains
and alleges as follows:
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

Plaintiff is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in Weber County,

State of Utah.
2.

Defendant Avis and Archibald Title Insurance Agency, limited company ("Avis and

Archibald") is a limited company doing business in Weber County, State of Utah.

3.

Defendant Jayson Cherry is an escrow agent doing business in Weber County, State

of Utah.
4.

Robin Archibald and William A. Avis are the principals in the Avis and Archibald

Title Insurance Agency and both reside in Weber County, State of Utah.
5.

Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation ("Lawyers Title") is a Virginia company doing

business in Weber County, State of Utah.
6.

TitlePac, Inc. ("TitlePac"), is an Oklahoma company doing business in Weber

County, State of Utah.
7.

Fireman's Fund Insurance Company ("Fireman's Fund") is a California corporation

doing business in Weber County, State of Utah.
8.

That on February 26,1997, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendants Avis and Archibald

with specific escrow terms for a loan to Wayne Ogden for the sole purpose of purchasing real
property on Midland Drive in Roy City, Weber County, State of Utah.
9.

On or about March .10,1997, Plaintiffs delivered to Jayson Cherry, an employee of

Defendant Avis and Archibald $396,000.00 to be held in escrow with Defendants Avis and
Archibald.
10.

That said funds were not to be disbursed except pursuant to specific written

instructions from Plaintiff.
11.

That contrary to the written instructions from Plaintiff, Defendants Avis and

Archibald and Jayson Cherry disbursed the funds to Wayne Ogden by issuing check number 5428
in the amount of $396,000.00.
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12.

Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry were instructed by Plaintiff and

Wayne Ogden that Plaintiffs $396,000.00 was to be repaid with a $600,000.00 payment to be
secured by a trust deed recorded against the Midland Drive property.
13.

Upon information and belief Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry as

escrow agent and fiduciary to Plaintiff disbursed the escrow funds for purposes other than
purchasing the Midland Drive property.
14.

Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry disbursed such funds without

recording a trust deed for the benefit of Plaintiff and without disclosing the disbursement to Plaintiff.
15.

Plaintiff has attempted to file a claim under Avis and Archibald's professional

liability policy but has been unable to get the policy or policy number from the Defendant insurance
companies.
16.

Defendant Avis and Archibald had a professional liability policy from Defendant

Fireman's Fund as evidenced by a copy of a check from Defendant Fireman's Fund to Defendant
Avis and Archibald for $132,545.49 for a claim made during the same period as Plaintiffs claim
(See Exhibit "B").
17.

Plaintiff was informed by Interstate Insurance Group, the adjuster for Defendant

Fireman's Fund, that Defendant Fireman's Fund disclaimed coverage to Avis and Archibald on
Plaintiffs claim (See Exhibit "C").
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
18.

Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs hereinabove

as though specifically set forth herein.
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19.

As escrow agent of Plaintiff, Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry had

a duty to strictly comply with all escrow instructions to Plaintiff and to not distribute the funds
except by specific instruction.
20.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry failed to

exercise ordinary skill care in their duty to follow escrow instructions and have negligently breached
such duty.
21.

Plaintiff has been damaged by Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry's

negligent breach of duty to follow escrow instructions in an amount to be established upon proof at
the time of trial.
22.

As a result of Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry's negligent failure

to follow escrow instructions, Plaintiff has been required to obtain the services of the Durbano Law
Firm in bringing this action and incurred reasonable attorney's fees herein for which it seeks
compensation.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
23.

Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs hereinabove

as though specifically set forth herein.
24.

As escrow agent of Plaintiff, Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry had

a duty to disclose to Plaintiff any defects or failures in the transaction which were known or should
have been known by the agent.
25.

Upon information and belief Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Avis and Archibald and

Jayson Cherry knew or should have known that the escrow funds were not used for the purposes
intended by Plaintiff and that there were various other irregularities in the transaction which could
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and did cause damage to the Plaintiff and that despite these irregularities Defendants Avis and
Archibald and Jayson Cherry failed to disclose any information to Plaintiff voluntarily.
26.

Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry failed to exercise ordinary skill

and care in fulfilling their duty and therefore breached their duty to disclose information regarding
irregularities in the transaction for which Plaintiff escrowed the funds which failure to timely
disclose caused Plaintiff to lack sufficient information to protect its interest.
27.

Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry's negligent failure to disclose has

damaged Plaintiff in an amount to be established upon proof at the time of trial.
28.

As a result of Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry's negligent failure

to disclosure, Plaintiff has been required to obtain the services of the Durbano Law Firm and in
bringing this action has incurred reasonable attorney's fees herein for which it seeks compensation.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
29.

Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs hereinabove

as though specifically set forth herein.
30.

As escrow agent of Plaintiff, Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry have

a duty to record any trust deed or other security instrument which protects Plaintiff s security interest
in real property which is the subject of the transaction.
31.

That in fact the specific instructions provided by Plaintiff require that a deed of trust

with assignment of rents be recorded in a first lien position and guaranteed an insured by Lawyer's
Title as a deed of trust to secure the $600,000 Promissory Note.
32.

Upon information and belief, Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry

failed to record any Trust Deed on behalf of Plaintiff on the Midland Drive property prior to the
disbursement of escrow funds contrary to the specific escrow instructions.
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33.

Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry failed to exercise ordinary skill

and care in obtaining the recording of the anticipated trust deed which secured Plaintiffs interests
and therefore have negligently breached their duty of care which breach has damaged Plaintiff in an
amount to be established upon proof at the time of trial.
34.

As a result of Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry's negligent failure

to follow escrow instruction, Plaintiff has been required to obtain the services of the Durbano Law
Firm in bringing this action and incurred reasonable attorney's fees for which it seeks compensation.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
35.

Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs hereinabove

as though specifically set forth herein.
36.

Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry's actions as alleged in each of the

above causes of action constitute a reckless indifference to Plaintiffs interests which are the very
interests that Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry are duty bound to protect as escrow
agent and fiduciary of Plaintiff. Given the agency relationship between the parties and the fact that
Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry are in the business of acting as escrow agents,
Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry's conduct toward Plaintiff is egregious and
outrageous and provides a strong basis for punitive and exemplary damages against Defendants Avis
and Archibald and Jayson Cherry equal to or exceeding $500,000.00.
37.

As a result of such outrageous conduct and reckless indifference of Defendants Avis

and Archibald and Jayson Cherry, Plaintiff has been required to retain the services of the Durbano
Law Firm and in bringing this action has incurred reasonable attorney's fees herein for which it
seeks compensation.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
38.

Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs hereinabove

as though specifically set forth herein.
39.

Defendant Avis and Archibald holds itself out to the public as a professional title

insurance agency, competent in the area of providing title services for property transactions.
40.

When Plaintiff utilized the services of Defendant Avis and Archibald based upon

Defendant Avis and Archibald's above-stated representation, Defendant Avis and Archibald had a
duty to provide title services that fell within the standard of care for the applicable title industry.
41.

By permitting money to be transferred out of escrow in contradiction to Plaintiffs

written escrow instructions, and failing to properly maintain policies and train employees and agents
regarding the requirement to follow written escrow instructions, Defendant Avis and Archibald
breached its duty of care to Plaintiff to safeguard Plaintiffs money in accordance with Plaintiffs
escrow instructions and industry standards, and such negligence has damaged Plaintiff in an amount
to be established upon proof at the time of trial.
42.

As a proximate result of Defendant Avis and Archibald's errors, Plaintiff has been

required to obtain the services of the Durbano Law Firm and in bringing this action has incurred
reasonable attorney's fees for which it seeks compensation.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
43.

Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs hereinabove

as though specifically set forth herein.
44.

Defendants Lawyers Title and Fireman's Fund knew that Defendant Firemen's

Fund's agent, Defendant TitlePac, had issued a professional liability insurance policy to Defendant
Avis and Archibald that was in force at the time of Plaintiff s claim.
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45.

Defendants Lawyers Title, Fireman's Fund, and TitlePac havefraudulentlyattempted

to conceal from Plaintiff that a professional liability insurance policy exists for Defendant Avis and
Archibald to cover Plaintiffs claim, which fraud has damaged Plaintiff in an amount to be
established upon proof at the time of trial.
46.

Plaintiff is a third party beneficiary under any and all policies of insurance issued by

Lawyers Title, Fireman's Fund and TitlePac, and that these parties are contractually liable for their
insurance liabilities.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
47.

Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs hereinabove

as though specifically set forth herein.
48.

Defendants Robin Archibald and William A. Avis knew that, although their agency

was required by Section 31A-23-211, Utah Code Annotated, to maintain a fidelity bond or
professional liability insurance policy in a face amount no less than $50,000 to provide protection
against the improper performance of any service in conjunction with the issuance of a contract or
policy of title insurance, that no such policy existed at the time that it agreed to escrow Plaintiffs
money and follow Plaintiffs escrow instructions.
49.

Defendants Robin Archibald and William A. Avis knew at that if they disclosed to

Plaintiff that the money Plaintiff was escrowing with their agency was not covered by a fidelity bond
or professional liability insurance policy in a face amount no less than $50,000, that Plaintiff would
have refused to escrow his money with Defendant Avis and Archibald.
50.

The failure of Defendants Robin Archibald and William A. Avis to inform Plaintiff

that no fidelity bond or professional liability insurance policy was in place for Plaintiffs escrow
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transaction constituted a fraud which fraud has damaged Plamtiff in an amount to be established
upon proof at the time of trial.
51.

As a result of thefraudof Defendants Robin Archibald and William A. Avis, Plaintiff

has been required to obtain the services of the Durbano Law Firm in bringing this action and
incurred reasonable attorney's fees for which it seeks compensation.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows:
1.

For a finding that Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry negligently

breached their duty of skill and care of Plaintiff in relation to the escrowed funds;
2.

For a finding that Defendants Lawyer's Title, Fireman's and TitlePac is liable for

damages incurred by their insured and that they committed a fraud upon Plaintiff in relation to the
denial of Plaintiff s claim for damages in relation to the escrowed funds and the unwillingness to
produce a policy or policy number for such insurance;
3.

For an award of damages in favor of Plaintiff in an amount to be established upon

proof at the time of trial;
4.

For punitive and exemplary damages in the amount of $500,000;

5.

For attorney's fees and costs incurred by Plaintiff in bringing this action; and

6.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

DATED this

day of December, 2001.

Douglas to . Durbano
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Plaintiffs Address:
476 W. Heritage Park Blvd., Suite 200
Layton, Utah 84041
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55 F.ist Monroe Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603
312-346-6400
FAX 312-346-5740

August 1,2001

Durvano Law Firm
476 West I leritage Park Blvd.
Suite 200
Layton, UT 84041
Attn: Douglas M . Durvano

Re:

Our Insured:
Claim No.:

Avis & Archibald Title Insurance
55001001300

Dear Mr. Durvano:

This will acknowledge receipt of your July 10, 2001 letter with regards lo the above-captioned file.
Please be advised that on June 6, 2001, the Fireman's Fund Insurance Company disclaimed coverage lo
Avis & Archibald Tille Insurance on this matter.
Sincerely,

MJK/lrall
7/27

1.P4
EXHIBIT "C"

Interstate hie <t ( .isu.ilty (c>m/>.io>'
( /in .IRO Insurant e ( omp.my
Interstate Indemnity ( nmfuiny
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R U L E 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given
when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be
the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When issues not raised by the
pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at
any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court
that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his
action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted
in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence
set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment
relates back to the date of the original pleading.
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Douglas M. Durbano (#4209)
DURBANO LAW FIRM
Attorneys for Plaintiff
476 W. Heritage Park Blvd., Suite 200
Layton,Utah 84041
Telephone: 801-776-4111
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

BIG SKY FINANCE COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
:
:
:
:

Plaintiff,
vs.

AVIS AND ARCHIBALD TITLE INSURANCE
AGENCY, limited company, LAWYERS TITLE
INSURANCE CORPORATION, a Virginia
corporation doing business in the State of Utah
FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY, :
a California corporation doing business in the state
of Utah, TITLE PAC, INC., an Oklahoma company :
doing business in the State of Utah, JAYSON
CHERRY, WILLIAM A. AVIS, and ROBIN
ARCHIBALD,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO
DEFENDANTS'OPPOSITION
MEMORANDUM REGARDING
MOTION TO AMEND

Civil No. 970907313

: Judge W. Brent West

Plaintiff, Big Sky Finance Company ("Big Sky") by and through its counsel of record hereby
submits the following reply to Defendants' Opposition Memorandum Regarding Motion to Amend.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This controversy started when Avis and Archibald mishandled $400,000.00 which

was placed in escrow, by releasing it to Wayne Ogden, contrary to written instructions. Ultimately
the funds were paid back to the escrow, by way of other investors of Wayne Ogden's ponzi scheme.
Plaintiffs reply to defendants' opposition memorandui

970907313

LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORPOR

of limitations. But, this argument is circular in that it assumes Lawyer's Title as principal had no
notice in the original or first Amended Complaint of the actions perpetrated by its agent.
Notwithstanding that this defense is not available, the Plaintiff would have numerous legal and
factual arguments which may defeat any statute of limitations defense, even if the Plaintiff were
bringing this action for the first time. For example, where the Defendant secrets itself from the state,
hides or otherwise denies that there is a policy of insurance or contractual obligation which would
bind it, or otherwise perpetrates acts of misrepresentation or fraud, then the statute of limitations
would not begin to run until the Plaintiff had the necessary facts to know of its cause of action.
Also, Plaintiffs cause of action may not have fully accrued until it had suffered actual damages,
which did not occur until the appeal was finalized, in which Big Sky was held liable to the
Bankruptcy Trustee for a preferential transfer, which appeal was handed down in December of 2002,
approximately one year ago. Further, any amended cause of action relates back to the original filing.
Finally, a claim against the agent tolls the statute of limitations for the same claims against its
principal, especially an undisclosed principal.
Therefore, the three points enumerated in the Bronson, case have been met in this case, i.e.,
that there has been no delay, or in other words the motion is timely, and the justification for the
delay was that the parties were waiting for the outcome of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, and
there has not been any resulting legal prejudice to the responding party.
Lawyer's Title also argues that the case of Bodell Constr, Co. v. Stewart Guar. Co., 954 P.2d
119 (Ut. Ct. App. 1997) would provide a defense in this matter rendering the proposed amendment
"Legally Insufficient and Futile" at page 10 of Response Memorandum.
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§ 3 1 A - 2 3 a - 4 0 7 . Liability of title insurers for acts of title insurance producers
Any title company, represented by one or more title insurance producers, is
directly and primarily liable to others dealing with the title insurance producers
for the receipt and disbursement of funds deposited in escrows with the title
insurance producers in all those transactions where a commitment or binder
for or policy or contract of title insurance of that title insurance company has
been ordered, or a preliminary report of the title insurance company has been
issued or distributed. This liability does not modify, mitigate, impair, or affect
the contractual obligations between the title insurance producers and the title
insurance company.
Laws 1985, c. 242, § 28; Laws 2002, c. 308, § 57, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 298,
§ 67, eff. May 5, 2003.
Codifications C 1953, § 31A-23-308.
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FILES BISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

APR 1 7 21

Bruce A. Maak, Of Counsel (2033)
Paul C. Drecksel (5946)
PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN, GEE & LOVELESS
Attorneys for Defendant
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: 801-532-7840
Fax: 801-532-7750

By.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MILLENNIA INVESTMENT
CORPORATION,

]
-1
1
)

ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs

;i

Civil No. 000902574 CN

ATTORNEYS TITLE GUARANTY FUND,
INC . et al.,

.)
.

Judge: J. Dennis Frederick

^ ^ \^y * ^-1

^-f * ^ * fc *

*. ^-^ *
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Plaintiff,

Defendant.

The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of plaintiff Millennia Investment Corporation,
a Utah corporation ("Millennia") dated June 30, 2000 and the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment of Attorneys Title Guaranty Fund ("ATGF") dated October 17, 2000 came on regularly
for hearing before the Court, the Honorable J Dennis Frederick presiding at 9:00 a.m. on
February 26, 2001, Millennia appearing through its counsel, Thomas R. Karrenberg, Stephen W.
Dougheny, and Nathan B. Wilcox, and ATGF appearing through its counsel, Paul C. Drecksel
and Bruce A. Maak, and the Court having reviewed the file and pleadings and the materials

submitted by the parties with respect to both Motions, having heard argument of counsel, being
fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ruled and ordered as follows:
A.

Millennia's Motion for Partial Summarv Judgment. Millennia's Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment sought partial summary judgment adjudicating ATGFs liability for
$433,625.00 in principal and interest thereon based upon Millennia's positions that Millennia was
the assignee of White Properties ("White"), and White deposited $433,625.00 into an escrow
account with Granite Title, White allegedly ordered and paid for a title policy from ATGF, and
Granite Title misappropriated the deposited funds, as a result of which Millennia claims ATGF is
liable to it under Utah Code Ann. §31A-23-308. Millennia submitted the Affidavit of Alan
Combs dated June 30, 2000 in support of its Motion ("Combs Affidavit"). Thereafter, Millennia
submitted the Affidavits of Raymond Horsley dated November 8, 2000 ("Horsley Affidavit"), tile
Affidavit of Dan Jones dated November 21, 2000 ("Jones Affidavit"), and the Affidavit of Lewis
Livingston dated November 10, 2000 ("Livingston Affidavit"). ATGF moved to strike portions
of the Combs and Livingston .Affidavits. The Court rules and orders as follows with respect to
Millennia's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and ATGFs Motions to Strike Portions of the
Combs and Livingston .Affidavits:
1.

ATGFs Motion to Strike Portions of the Combs Affidavit is hereby granted.

Paragraphs 2 through 9 of the Combs .Affidavit are inadmissible and must be stricken because
they fail to comply with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(a), the affiant lacked personal
knowledge of the matters stated therein, the statements contained therein lack foundation, the
statements therein mischaracterize the evidence, the statements therein improperly describe the

contents of documents in violation of the best evidence rule, and the statements therein constitute
improper legal conclusions.
2.

Paragraphs 2 through 9 of the Combs Affidavit be and the same are hereby

stricken.
3.

ATGFs Motion to Strike the Livingston Affidavit be and the same is hereby

granted. Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, and 11 of the Livingston Affidavit must be stricken pursuant
to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(e) and applicable law because they contain
impermissible representations regarding legislative history, conclusory statements without
evidentiary foundation, and inadmissible legal opinions.
4.

Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, and 11 of the Livingston Affidavit be and the same are

hereby stricken.
5.

The evidentiary materials submitted by ATGF give rise to multiple genuine issues

of material fact which preclude the granting of Millennia's Motion for Summary Judgment, and
Millennia failed to demonstrate by admissible evidence an entitlement to summary judgment.
6

As set forth in greater detail below under paragraph B.2 and B.3, Utah Code Ann.

v^3 1A-23-308 is unenforceable as a matter of law because it is violative of equal protection and
due process clauses of the Utah Constitution and/or if constitutionally construed, that statute does
not apply to the facts presented here.
7.

Attached hereto marked Exhibit 1 is a five page document alleged by Millennia to

constitute a commitment for title insurance that fulfills the requirements of Utah Code Ann.
§3 1 A-23-308. Based upon the undisputed facts, Exhibit 1 does not constitute a commitment or
binder for or policy or contract of title insurance of ATGF or a preliminary report of ATGF
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within the meaning of Section 31A-23-308 for each of the following independent reasons: (i)
Exhibit 1 does not mention ATGF, Exhibit 1 on its face states that it is enforceable only if a
cover is attached, and no cover was attached, Exhibit 1 does not contain essential elements
required to form a commitment to issue title insurance because it contains no commitment or
agreement to issue a policy, and does not identify a proposed insured; (ii) Exhibit 1 does not
qualify as a binder or commitment under the governing statutes, which require that a binder or
commitment contain a description of the subject and amount of insurance; (iii) Exhibit 1 is too
indefinite to create an enforceable contract because it lacks essential material terms, including the
amount of insurance to be provided, the amount of the insurance premium, and the name of the
insured; and (iv) Exhibit 1 was not issued with respect to the transaction in connection with
which the funds in question were misappropriated.
8.

There exist disputed issues of material fact as to whether Millennia/White ever

orally or by letter requested or ordered a policy of title insurance of ATGF at all. Based upon the
undisputed facts, however, there was no ordering of a commitment, binder, policy or contract of
title insurance within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. Section 31 A-23-308 because no
enforceable order was received by ATGF To constitute such an enforceable order, the order
must have been written, contain all essential terms, and be accepted by ATGF, none of which
occurred here.
9

Based upon the undisputed facts. Millennia and White looked to Horsley (who

was an employee of Granite Title), individually to perform for Millennia/White functions relating
to the origination of the subject loan, to act as a loan broker, to negotiate with the borrower with
respect to the loan, and to perform due diligence. White and Millennia also expected Horsley to
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handle the closing of the subject loan as a Granite Title employee and in that capacity arrange for
the issuance of a title insurance policy as the agent of a title insurance company White and
Millennia's deposit of funds with Horsley, who was performing acts both as an employee of
Granite Title and separately and individually for Millennia/White, is not a transaction intended to
be covered by Utah Code Ann §31A-23-308, even assuming it were constitutional
10.

Based upon the undisputed facts, Millennia and White were aware that Horsley

was individually accepting a substantial payment from them in connection with a transaction in
which they expected Horsley to act as an employee of Granite Title in handling the closmg and
arranging for the issuance of a title policy Millennia and White's causing or allowing Horsley to
undertake duties for both Granite Title and separately for them, coupled with ATGFs ignorance
of those matters, created a conflict of interest and breach of the duties that Horsley owed Granite
Title and through it to ATGF ATGF is entitled to rescission of any commitment, binder, policy
or contract of title insurance or preliminary report that was issued, assuming such issuance
occurred in this case, which did not in fact occur
11

Based on the undisputed facts. Horsley acted on behalf of White and Millennia in

onmnatinu their loan, performing due diligence on their loan, and handing all contact with the
prospective borrowers concerning the loan and closing and was individually paid a $4,000 00 fee
upon closing by Millennia/White Those actions were not within the scope of Horsley's authority
with Granite Title or Granite Title's authority with ATGF Horsley knew the fraudulent nature of
the transaction in which he was acting

ATGF was ignorant of the circumstances surroundmg the

transaction Because Horsley's knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the transaction was
integrally related to his duties for White and Millennia, that knowledge is imputed to White and
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Millennia. Because Horsley's duties to Granite Title and to Granite Title on behalf of ATGF had
no connection with the subject matter to which his knowledge related, his knowledge of the
fraudulent nature of the transaction is not imputed to ATGF.
12.

For the foregoing reasons, Millennia's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be

and it is hereby denied.
B.

ATGFs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. ATGF moved for partial

summary judgment upon the grounds (i) that Section 31A-23-3 08 violates constitutional equal
protection requirements, (ii) that statute violates constitutional due process requirements, and (iii)
if that statute is enforceable and applies here, then the jury must apportion damages by
comparing the relative fault of appropriate parties under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-38.
1.

There exist no genuine issues of material fact bearing upon ATGFs Motion for

Summary Judgment.
2

Utah Code Ann. §31A-23-308 violates Article I, Section 24 of the Utah

Constitution (which requires that "[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation")
because it treats title insurers differently than other similarly situated entities without a
reasonable basis. Title insurance agents both handle escrow closings and issue title insurance on
behalf of title companies (which are the actual insurers). In addition to title insurance agents,
escrow companies, lawyers, banks, mortgage brokers, and real estate agents handle funds in
connection with real estate closings and escrows, but only closings handled by title insurance
agents subject title companies to liability. There is no rational basis upon which strict liability
can be imposed on title companies but not on other similarly situated principals. Although
parties may place funds in escrow with entities other than title insurance agents, the statute
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similes out title companies as the only entity that may be held strictly liable for the mishandling
of such funds and only subjects them to liability as to closings handled by title insurance
companies.
3.

Utah Code Ann. §31A-23-308 violates the due process clause of the Utah

Constitution, Article I, Section 7 because the statute imposes liability on someone other than the
party at fault (here, the title company) which had no knowledge of and could not be expected to
have prevented the actionable conduct. To construe §31 A-23-308 in a constitutionally
permissible manner requires that the statute be read to require that the title company have some
knowledge and/or control over the fraudulent acts of the title insurance agent before liability is
imposed. Thus, the statute must be read to require that the title company issue or distribute a
commitment, accept an order for title insurance, or otherwise participate in the transaction before
being held liable. Because the undisputed facts establish that ATGF had no knowledge of the
transaction and did not issue or distribute a commitment or accept an order for title insurance, the
statute, construed constitutionally, does not subject ATGF to liability.
A

Because of the other rulings of the Court, the Court does not address ATGFs

argument that liability under Section 3 1 A-23-308 must be allocated in accordance with Utah's
comparative fault statute
5.

The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of ATGF be and the same is hereby

granted.
6.

The First Cause of Action of the Complaint herein of Millennia be and the same is

hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon its merits. This Order does not address whether or not
its various rulings affect the other causes of action contained in the Complaint.
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Miscellaneous. The Court defers its decision on an award of costs until the Coun
enters afinalOrder disposing of all of the claims of all of the parties in this action.
MADE AND ENTERED this

({f^
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of

KU///'

, 2001.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served by hand delivering a copy this cW
March, 2001, addressed to:
Thomas R Karrenberg, Esq.
Nathan B. Wilcox, Esq.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Attorneys for Plaintiff
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Kris Hennod, Secretary
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71P.3d631
71 P.3d 631, 474 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 2003 UT App 157
(Cite as: 71 P.3d 631,2003 UT App 157)

C
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nana G. PENROSE, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Bryant ROSS, an individual (formerly identified as
Doe 1); Christopher Ross,
an individual; Does 2-5, inclusive, whose true
names are not known to
plaintiff, Defendants and Appellee.
No. 20010943 CA.
May 22, 2003.
Motorist, days before statute of limitations was to
expire, filed complaint alleging owner of other
vehicle and Does 1 - 5 pulled of parking lot and
negligently hit her vehicle. After statute of
limitations expired motorist amended her complaint
to identify son of vehicle's owner as the driver of
the vehicle. The Third District Court, Salt Lake
Department, Leon A. Dever, J., granted owner's and
son's motions for summary judgment, and motorist
appealed the summary judgment for owner's son.
The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that: (1)
failure to name son in original complaint was not a
misnomer or technical mistake, and (2) father and
son did not have an identity of interest for purposes
of determining whether amendment related back to
date of original complaint despite the running of the
statute of limitations.

adds new parties for those brought before the court
by the original pleadings, with the exception that
relation back occurs as to both plaintiff and
defendant, when new and old parties have an
identity of interest, so it can be assumed or proved
the relation back is not prejudicial. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 15(c).
[2] Limitation of Actions €=>124
241kl24 Most Cited Cases
[2] Limitation of Actions €=>125
241kl25 Most Cited Cases
An "identity of interest" exists, for purposes of
allowing an amendment to a pleading substituting or
adding new parties to relate back to the date of the
original pleading, despite the running of the statute
of limitations, when the real parties in interest are
sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or were
involved in them unofficially, from an early stage.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(c).
[3] Limitation of Actions €=>121(2)
241kl21(2) Most Cited Cases
In misnomer cases, the correction of a party name is
a formal change, rather than a substantial change;
thus, amending the complaint does not affect the
rights of the added party, and fairly relates back to
the original filing, despite the running of the statute
of limitations. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15.
[4] Limitation of Actions €=^121(2)
241kl21(2) Most Cited Cases

Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Limitation of Actions €==>124
241kl24 Most Cited Cases
[1] Limitation of Actions €=>125
241kl25 Most Cited Cases
Rule allowing an amendment of a pleading to relate
back to the date of the original pleading generally
will not apply to an amendment which substitutes or
© 2005 Thomson/West. No C

[4] Limitation of Actions €=^124
241kl24 Most Cited Cases
Amended negligence complaint of motorist, adding
as a party the other vehicle's owner's son as the
driver of the vehicle that struck her, did not relate
back to date of original complaint identifying owner
and Does 1-5 as being the negligent parties, on
ground that failure to identify owner's son in
original complaint was a misnomer or technical
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

http://print.westlawxom/delivery.html?dest=atp&format=HTML

12/5/2005

71P.3d631

Page 2

71 P.3d 631, 474 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 2003 UT App 157
(Cite as: 71 P.3d 631,2003 UT App 157)
mistake; as evidenced by accident report motorist
was given notice at the scene that owner's son was
the driver of the vehicle that struck her vehicle.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15.
[5] Limitation of Actions €=^124
241kl24 Most Cited Cases
If an identity of interest is established between the
party identified in the original pleading and the
party added in the amended pleading, a party
generally cannot be prejudiced, for purposes of
determining whether the amended pleading relates
back to the original pleading despite the running of
the statute of limitations. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule
15(c).
[6] Limitation of Actions €=>124
241kl24 Most Cited Cases
[6] Limitation of Actions €=>125
241kl25 Most Cited Cases
An "identity of interest," for purposes of
determining whether an amended pleading adding
or substituting a party relates back to the original
pleading despite the running of the statute of
limitations, requires parties to have the "same"
interest. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(c).
[7] Limitation of Actions €^=>124
241kl24 Most Cited Cases
Father and son did not have an "identity of interest"
in negligence action of motorist for injuries she
received in accident with car owned by father but
driven by son, and thus amended complaint adding
son as a party did not relate back to original
complaint for purposes of the statute of limitations;
though son lived with father, was insured under
father's insurance policy and father presumably
knew that son was driving car and in an accident,
defense of father was that he was not negligent or
liable because he was not the driver, defense of son
would be that statute of limitations expired and that
he did not act negligently, and thus a disposition as
to either would not affect the claims or defenses
available to the other. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(c).
*632 Scott N. Cunningham, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant.

Michael W. Wright and Richard K. Glauser, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges
THORNE.

DAVIS,

GREENWOOD

and

OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
**1 Nana Penrose (Penrose) appeals the trial
court's grant of summary judgment for defendant,
Bryant Ross (Ross), claiming error in the court's
determination that her *633 amended complaint
does not properly relate back to the original
complaint. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
**2 On November 17, 2000, just days prior to the
expiration of the statute of limitations on her claim,
Penrose filed a complaint for negligence (Original
Complaint) against Christopher Ross (Father) and
Does 1-5. In the Original Complaint, Penrose
alleged that she was traveling southbound on 900
East when Father and Does 1-5 pulled out of a
parking lot and hit her car. Penrose claimed that
Father and Does 1-5 were negligent in: failing to
pay attention to existing and changing traffic
conditions; failing to look out for vehicles on the
road, resulting in a traffic ticket; driving too fast;
and driving and operating an automobile
improperly. Penrose claimed damages from serious
injuries she sustained, resulting in permanent
impairment, mental anguish, sleeplessness, nausea,
headaches, and dizziness. Penrose additionally
sought damages exceeding $3,000 for various
medical services.
**3 On December 27, 2000, after the statute of
limitations had run, Penrose filed an Amended
Complaint, identifying Doe 1 as Ross, Father's son.
Penrose's Amended Complaint names Father as the
owner of the vehicle but alleges that the negligent
party was Ross, who was driving the car, not Father.
Aside from the change in the identity of the
negligent party, all other allegations as to cause and
injury remained the same as in the Original
Complaint.
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**4 Father responded to the Original Complaint
on January 2, 2001, denying significant parts. [FN1]
Father also filed an affidavit on January 5, 2001,
stating that although he was the owner of the
vehicle involved in the accident, he was not the
driver. Father included a copy of the police report
that identified Ross as the driver of the car that
collided with Penrose.
FN1. Father's response to the Original
Complaint
and
Penrose's
Amended
Complaint appear to have crossed in the
mail.
**5 Ross filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,
claiming the action against him was barred by the
statute of limitations. Father also filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment, arguing that because Penrose
had amended her complaint alleging that Ross was
the true driver of the vehicle, he could not be liable.
**6 The trial court granted Ross's Motion for
Summary Judgment, determining that the statute of
limitations had run and that no identity of interest
existed between Father and Ross. The trial court
also granted Father's Motion for Summary
Judgment, concluding that a "cause of action for
negligence may not be made out solely on the basis
of ownership." Penrose appeals the summary
judgment granted to Ross.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
**7 Penrose contends that the trial court erred in
granting Ross's Motion for Summary Judgment. "In
considering an appeal from a grant of summary
judgment, we view the facts in a light most
favorable to the losing party below. And in
determining whether those facts require, as a matter
of law, the entry of judgment for the prevailing
party below, we give no deference to the trial
court's conclusions of law: those conclusions are
reviewed for correctness." Blue Cross & Blue
Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989).
[FN2]
FN2. Although Penrose asserts that the
trial court's findings of fact are inadequate,
we believe the undisputed facts contained
© 2005 Thomson/West. No C

in the court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law are sufficient as a
matter of law to support its grant of
summary judgment.
ANALYSIS
**8 The traffic accident from which this suit arose
occurred on November 21, 1996. Thus, the statute
of limitations for Penrose's claim of negligence
expired on November 21, 2000. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12- 25(3) (2002) ("An action may be
brought within four years: ... for relief not
otherwise provided for by law."); see also State
Bank of S Utah v. Troy Hygro Sys., 894 P.2d 1270,
1274 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (stating claims of
negligence are governed by Utah Code Ann. §
78-15-25(3)). On November 17, 2000, just *634
four days before the expiration of the statute of
limitations, Penrose filed her Original Complaint,
asserting that Father's negligent driving resulted in
an accident injuring Penrose. Penrose properly
filed an Amended Complaint prior to service of
Father's responsive pleading. See Utah R. Civ. P.
15(a) ("A party may amend his pleading once as a
matter of course at any time before a responsive
pleading is served ...."). However, the Amended
Complaint, filed on December 27, 2000, naming
Ross as defendant Doe 1, was filed after the statute
of limitations expired. Therefore, the issue before
this court is whether the Amended Complaint
properly relates back to the Original Complaint,
thus permitting Penrose to pursue her action against
Ross.
[1][2] **9 Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)
governs the relation back of amendments, stating:
"Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the
amended pleading arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to
be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment
relates back to the date of the original pleading." Id.
Rule 15(c) further "allows a plaintiff to cure
defects in his or her original complaint despite the
intervening running of a statute of limitations."
Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 265 (Utah
1995). Generally, however, rule 15(c)
will not apply to an amendment which substitutes
or adds new parties for those brought before the
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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court by the original pleadings ....
There is an exception to this rule. The exception
operates where there is a relation back, as to both
plaintiff and defendant, when new and old parties
have an identity of interest; so it can be assumed
or proved the relation back is not prejudicial.
The rationale underpinning this exception is one
which obstructs a mechanical use of a statute of
limitations; to prevent adjudication of a claim.
Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906
(Utah 1976) (emphasis added); see also Vina v.
Jefferson Ins. Co. ofN.Y., 761 P.2d 581, 586 (Utah
Ct.App.1988) (applying identity of interest rule laid
out in Doxey-Layton ). "An identity of interest
exists 'when "the real parties in interest were
sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or were
involved in them unofficially, from an early stage." '
" Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247,f 29, 53 P.3d
2 (quoting Sulzen v. Williams, 1999 UT App 76,f
14, 977 P.2d 497 (quoting Doxey-Layton, 548 P.2d
at 906)), cert, denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002).
**10 Citing the above cases, Penrose argues that
there is an "identity of interest" when the real party
is alerted to the proceeding so as to avoid prejudice.
Penrose reasons that it is reasonable to assume that
Father told Ross he was served with a complaint
asserting damages resulting from the accident
involving Ross because (1) Father was served at the
same residence as Ross, (2) Father knew Ross was
driving his car and was in an accident, (3) Father
knew he was not the driver involved in the accident,
(4) Ross was insured by Father's insurance policy,
and (5) Father and Ross have the same attorney.
Therefore, Penrose argues, Ross had notice of the
lawsuit and would not be prejudiced by being added
as a named party in the Amended Complaint.
**11 Ross argues that Utah courts have allowed
the relation back of amendments to complaints
incorporating newly named parties in two types of
cases: (1) in so called "misnomer cases," and (2)
where there is a true "identity of interest." We
agree, but determine this case does not fit either.
[3] **12 In the misnomer cases, Utah has
permitted amendments where the complaint
contains a technical defect in the naming or

identification of a party.
"A misnomer is involved when the correct party
was served so that the party before the Court is
the one Plaintiff intended to sue, but the name or
description of the party in the Complaint is
deficient in some respect." 6A [Charles A.
Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane]
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1498 (2d
ed.1990). Furthermore, "[i]f the body of the
complaint correctly identifies the party, or if the
proper person has actually been served with
process, courts generally will allow an
amendment under Rule 15 to correct technical
defects in the caption. *635 This seems
appropriate inasmuch as a defective caption or
even its complete absence is merely a formal
error and never shall be viewed as a fatal defect."
5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1321, at 728-30 (2d
ed. 1990) (footnotes omitted).
Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 370
(Utah 1996) (alteration in original). As explained
in Otchy v. City of Elizabeth Bd. of Educ, 325
N.J.Super. 98, 737 A.2d 1151 (App.Div.1999), in
misnomer cases, the correction of a party name is a
" 'formal' " change, rather than a " 'substantial' "
change; thus, amending the complaint "does not
affect the rights of the added party, and ... fairly
relatefs] back to the original filing[,] despite the
running of the statute of limitations." Id. at 1155.
**13 For example, in Sulzen v. Williams, a woman
was hit and killed by a rock dislodged by two
minors hiking above her. See 1999 UT App 76 at \
2, 977 P.2d 497. In a suit for negligence, the named
defendants were the mother and guardian of one of
the minors, and the father and guardian of the other
minor. See id. at 1f 3. However, the text of the
complaint alleged that the minors were the negligent
parties. See id. at f 4. The trial court granted the
parents' motion for summary judgment and
prohibited the plaintiffs from amending the
complaint to name the minors as defendants
because the statute of limitations had run and the
parents were admittedly not negligent. See id. at %
^ 5-9. On appeal, this court reversed, stating that
the complaint could properly be amended because
the parents "had an identity of interest with their
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children, and thus relating 1:I:M [plaintiffs']
amendment back would not have been prejudicial."
Id. at If 15 (emphasis added). Because "the parents
[were] incorrectly named as defendants in the
original complaint's caption- i.e., named in the
wrong place in the caption's phraseology," we
reasoned that although a mistake was made in the
naming of the parties, the minor children "were
sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, and that they
thus had sufficient identity of interest with thenparents, to make relation back appropriate." Id.
(footnote omitted); see also Wilcox, 911 P.2d at
370- 71 (permitting an amendment to a complaint
that incorrectly named "Geneva Rock Co.," rather
than "Geneva Rock Products, Inc.," where the
summons correctly listed the company name and the
vice president was properly served); 5 Wright &
Miller, supra, § 1321 ("If the body of the complaint
correctly identifies the party ... courts generally will
allow an amendment under [r]ule 15 to cornx!
technical defects in the caption.").
[4] **14 This is not the case presented here.
Unlike Sulzen, where the correct party was
specifically identified in the text of the complaint as
the negligent party, see id. 1999 UT App 76 at f
4, 977 P.2d 497, Ross was not identified in any
capacity in the Original Complaint. Here, there was
no misnomer or "technical" mistake; Penrose
purposefully sued Father for negligence and sought
to add Ross as a defendant and the negligent party
after the expiration of the statute of limitations.
Furthermore, it cannot be argued that Penrose
merely made a technical mistake in naming Father
as the negligent driver, because, as evidenced by the
police report, Penrose was given notice at the scene
of the accident that Ross was the driver and Father
was the owner of the vehicle. [FN3]
FN3. The original police report clearly
lists Father as owner of the vehicle, Ross
as the driver of the vehicle, and
specifically charges Ross with "Improper
LookOut"
[5] **15 Having determined that the present case
is not a misnomer case, we next determine whether
a true identity of interest exists, permitting the
© 2005 Thomson/West. No C
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amended complaint to relate back. If an identity of
interest is established, a party generally cannot be
prejudiced. See Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548
P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976) (stating amendment
permitted "where there is a relation back, ... when
new and old parties have an identity of interest; so
it can be assumed or proved the relation back is not
prejudicial"); Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of N.Y.,
761 P.2d 581, 586 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (same).
[6] **16 Black's Law Dictionary defines "identity"
as "[t]he identical nature of two or more things."
Black's Law Dictionary 748 (7th ed.1999).
Webster's defines identity as *636 "sameness of
essential or generic character in different instances"
and "the condition of being the same with
something described or asserted." Webster's Ninth
New Collegiate Dictionary 597 (1986). Therefore,
an identity of interest requires parties to have the
"same" interest. This definition is supported by the
Utah Supreme Court in Attorney General v.
Pomeroy, 93 Utah 426, 73 P.2d 1277, 1294 (1937).
In Pomeroy, the issue before the court was whether
a final judgment as to one issue in a case with
multiple parties was effective as to all parties for the
purpose of an appeal. [FN4] See id. at 1294. The
court applied the "identity of interest" test, which it
defined as "whether the determination of the issues
as to any defendant depends on or affects the
determination of the issues as to the other
defendants." [FN5] Id
FN4. Determining whether an identity of
interest exists is necessary in numerous
contexts. See, e.g., Doxey-Layton Co. v.
Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 905 (Utah 1976)
(finding an identity of interest between
decedent and heirs so as to permit an
amendment adding heirs as parties);
Nunnelly v. First Fed. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n
of Ogden, 107 Utah 347, 154 P.2d 620,
626 (1944) (outlining rule to determine
parties in a class action and requiring there
be an identity of interest); Conder v. Hunt,
2000 UT App 105,1[ 9, 1 P.3d 558 (noting
that claim preclusion applies in limited
exception for those in privity with one
another evaluated by the parties' identity of
toOrig.U.S. <i.m
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interest); James Constructors, Inc. v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 888 P.2d 665, 669 (Utah
Ct.App.1994) (stating an identity of
interest exists between principal and surety
in the context of indemnity).
FN5. Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 93
Utah 426, 73 P.2d 1277, 1294 (1937),
implemented a rule that the statute of
limitations for debt is extended by
acknowledgment or partial payment. This
rule was superceded by statute, as held in
State Bank of Southern Utah v. Troy
Hygro Systems, 894 P.2d 1270, 1276
(Utah Ct.App.1995). However, its analysis
as to identity of interest was not affected.
**17 Similarly, in Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App
247, 53 P.3d 2, this court determined that an
identity of interest existed between an employer and
an employee, permitting an amendment to the
complaint adding the employer as a party to the
complaint. In Nunez, a malpractice action was filed
against a physician alleging damages caused by the
physician's performance of a medical treatment.
See id. at \ 5. Nunez filed a motion to amend the
complaint to name the physician's employer, the
University of Utah Hospital (Hospital), as a
defendant. See id. at ffif 5-6. The trial court
denied Nunez's motion and she appealed. See id. at
1[ 6. In determining whether the amended
complaint related back to the original complaint,
this court analyzed rule 15(c) and cases outlining
the exception permitting the addition of parties
where an identity of interest is established. See id.
at f 29.
**18 We held that an identity of interest existed
between the Hospital and the physician because the
cause of action " 'arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth ... in the original
pleading.' " Id. (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c)).
This court also noted that the Hospital had potential
vicarious liability as the employer of the physician.
See id. at fflf 27-34. Further, the University
provided legal counsel for the physician, asserting
that the physician was acting within the scope of his
employment by the Hospital and was entitled to the

protections of the Governmental Immunity Act.
[FN6] See id.
FN6. Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, 53
P.3d 2, also addressed rule 15(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requiring
that amendments should be permitted
"when justice so requires." Id. at f 19.
That discussion appropriately focuses on
prejudice.
[7] **19 In Nunez, any disposition of the case
against the physician would necessarily affect the
Hospital's liability. Thus, an identity of interest
existed because the legal position and defenses of
the two parties were the "same." However, in the
present case, had Penrose's Original Complaint
properly named the parties, a disposition of the case
against Father would not affect a determination as
to Ross because the two parties do not have the
same legal interest in the outcome of the case.
Father's defense is that he was not negligent or
liable because he was not the driver. On the other
hand, Ross's affirmative defense focuses on the
running of the statute of limitations. Even if the
claim had been properly filed, Ross's defense would
be that he did not act negligently. A disposition as
to either party does not affect the claims or defenses
available to the other *637 party. Thus, where they
do not have the "same" legal interest there is no
identity of interest.
**20 Had there been an identity of interest, there
would necessarily be no prejudice. In Nunez, the
court stated, "new defendants sought to be added
must have an identity of interest with the original
party named in the complaint, 'so it can be assumed
or proved the relation back is not prejudicial.' " Id.
at | 29 (emphasis added) (quoting Wilcox v.
Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1996)
); see Doxey-Layton, 548 P.2d at 905 (same). If
prejudice alone dictated whether an identity of
interest existed, the exception to amending
complaints would swallow the rule and allow
relation back whenever an unnamed party happened
to know about the filing of a complaint. Therefore,
because we find that no identity of interest exists
between Father and Ross, we need not address
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whether there was prejudice. Furthermore, because
there is no identity of interest Penrose's Amended
Complaint cannot properly relate back.
CONCLUSION
**21 The trial court correctly determined there
was no identity of interest between Father and Ross
to permit relation back of the Amended Complaint
adding Ross as a defendant. Relation as father and
son and Ross's possible knowledge of the Original
Complaint are insufficient to create a legal identity
of interest in the lawsuit. [FN7] Thus, we affirm.
FN 7. U/e note that the relation-back
provision is an exception to the statute of
limitations. Penrose had four years to
ascertain the identity of the driver of the
car that allegedly injured her. She did not
commence that inquiry early enough to
avoid the expiration of the statute of
limitations.
**22 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS and
WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., Judges.
71 P.3d 63
App 157
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Before Judges JACKSON, BENCH, and ORMR
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
ORME, Judge:
* 1 It is questionable whether Appellant's opening
brief adequately marshals the evidence. See Atlas
Steel, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2002 UT 112,
fflf 41-43, 61 P.3d 1053 (requiring an appellant to
"undertake and meet its heavy marshaling burden in
its opening memorandum of law on appeal" rather
than "in its reply brief). Although the brief does
refer to some testimony supporting each challenged
finding, it cannot be said that Appellant's counsel,
in undertaking the marshaling burden, has amassed
© 2005 Thomson/West. No
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all of the supporting evidence, as required by West
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,
1315 (Utah Ct.App.1991).
For example, Appellant challenges
finding
seventeen, which states that she "has repeatedly
and continuously failed to provide the children with
adequate food, clothing, shelter, education, or other
care necessary for [the children's] physical, mental,
and emotional health and development." Appellant's
purported marshaling as to this finding consists only
of the following statement: "The evidence presented
at trial that supports this finding deals only with the
alleged instability of Appellant's housing situation
and that Appellant had not paid child support." It
can hardly be said that this vague evidentiary
summary includes "every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports "
finding seventeen. Id. (emphasis in original).
Noticeably absent from this summary is the fact, as
the State pointed out in its brief, that it is the foster
parents rather than Appellant who have provided
the children with sustenance for a substantial
amount of time, both before and after they became
the children's foster parents.
However,
we
need
not
delve
into
a
finding-by-finding analysis of the adequacy of
Appellant's marshaling effort because we can
readily resolve this case on the merits. The State
presented evidence that supports all of the findings
that Appellant challenges. Although much of
Appellant's and her mother's testimony is contrary
to the State's evidence, we defer to the juvenile
court's credibility determinations, and we do not
disturb the reasonable inferences it drew from the
testimony it heard. See State v. Reed, 839 P.2d 878,
879 (Utah Ct.App.1992) ("Ultimately, it is the
province of the trier of fact to determine which
testimony and facts to believe and what inferences
to draw from those facts."). Therefore, Appellant's
factual challenges are unavailing.
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As for the question of whether the trial court was
subject to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407(3) (2002),
Appellant did not preserve any such argument
below and her opening brief fails to "argue plain
error or exceptional circumstances, and we
therefore decline to address [this] claim." In re S.Y.,
2003 UT App 66,H 14, 468 Utah Adv. Rep. 10.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON,
Presiding Judge and RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge.
Not Reported in P.3d, 2003 WL 21290704 (Utah
App.), 2003 UT App 108
END OF DOCUMENT
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Before * ACKSON, BILLINGS, and DAVIS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BILLINGS.
*1 Plaintiff-appellant Tammy Bronson appeals the
trial court's grant of summary judgment against her
and in favor of defendant-respondent Jones and its
denial of Bronson's motion to amend her complaint.
We affirm.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). We review a grant of summary
judgment for correctness. See Carter v. Milford
Valley Mem'l Hosp., 2000 UT App 21, % 12, 996
P.2d 1076.
To establish alienation of affection, Bronson "must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that it was
the conduct of [Jones] that constituted a controlling
cause of the injury to [Bronson's] consortium
interests and that [Jones's] conduct was not just
incidental to other causative factors that destroyed
or damaged the marriage or conjugal relationship."
Norton v. McFarlane, 818 P.2d 8, 15 (Utah 1991).
© 2005 ThomsonAVest. No
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As explained by the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
In order for liability to arise for alienation of
affections there must be active and affirmative
conduct. Inaction is not enough to subject a
defendant to the liability. There must be some act
on the part of the defendant intended to induce or
accomplish the results.... It is only when there is
such
active
participation,
initiative,
or
encouragement on the part of the defendant that
he or she has in fact played a substantial part in
inducing or causing one spouse's loss of the other
spouse's affections, that liability arises.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 683 cmt. g
(1977) (emphasis added).
The trial court interpreted Norton to require
Bronson to identify the existence of efforts to
alienate by Jones, aimed directly at Mr. Bronson,
which were the controlling cause of the Bronsons'
marital discord. It was undisputed that, while Jones
had contacted Mrs. Bronson, Jones had not
contacted Mr. Bronson in four years, except for one
telephone call in 1998. Thus, the court determined
that Jones did not actively pursue Mr. Bronson such
that Mrs. Bronson could prove by clear and
convincing evidence that Jones's conduct toward
Mr. Bronson was the controlling cause of the
marital discord.
Bronson argues that her affidavit, as well as the
affidavits of her sisters-in-law Amy and Tina
Bronson, raised material issues of fact with regard
to Jones's conduct. However, while these affidavits
do address Jones's alleged conduct toward Mrs.
Bronson, they do not identify any alienation efforts
aimed directly at Mr. Bronson. Thus, the trial court
was correct in granting summary judgment in favor
of Jones.
Bronson also argues the trial court abused its
discretion in denying her motion to amend her
complaint to plead invasion of privacy. Under the
I Jtah Rules of Civil Procedure, once responsive
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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pleadings have been filed, "a party may amend his
pleading only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires." Utah
R.Civ.P. 15(a). "The standard of review of a denial
to amend pleadings is abuse of discretion." Kasco
Serv. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1992).
*2 This court has held that "Utah courts should
consider the following factors in determining
whether to allow amendment: (1) the timeliness of
the motion; (2) the justification for delay; and (3)
any resulting prejudice to the responding party."
Atcitty v. Board of Educ, 967 P.2d 1261, 1264
(Utah Ct.App.1998) (citing Swift Stop, Inc. v. Wight,
845 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah Ct.App.1992)).
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Bronson's motion to amend.
First, Bronson attempted to set forth new issues in
her amended complaint. Second, Bronson filed her
motion after Jones had filed her summary judgment
motion. Third, we conclude that Bronson was aware
of the "new issues" raised in the amended complaint
long before her motion was filed, and that there was
no justifiable reason for the delay. We therefore
affirm the trial court's denial of Bronson's motion to
amend her complaint.
JACKSON, A.P.J. and DAVIS, J., concur.
Not Reported in P.3d, 2000 WL 33244137 (Utah
App.), 2000 UT App 284
END OF DOCUMENT
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